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PREFACE
Litigation regarding liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)1 for the cleanup of sites
contaminated with hazardous substances is booming. Between January and Au-
gust 1990, two courts of appeals decided a critical issue concerning the potential
liability of shareholders whose corporations are liable for cleanup under CER-
CLA. One court held that CERCLA can impose liability directly on sharehold-
ers without having to resort to traditional theories of shareholder liability such
as piercing the corporate veil.' The other court reached the opposite result and
held that shareholders could not be held liable directly under CERCLA and
that the rule of limited liability prevails.3 Two other circuit courts and more
than a dozen district courts have considered the question.4 This conflict among
the courts raises questions of statutory interpretation and of the fundamental
relationship between CERCLA and state corporation laws, which generally
grant limited liability to shareholders. The magnitude of the problem and the
large number of cases suggest this issue is bound for resolution either by the
United States Supreme Court or, since CERCLA is due for reauthorization in
1991, by Congress.'
I. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9657 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990). Enacted in 1980, CERCLA was reauthorized in
October 1986 for an additional five years by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) (Pub.
L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613). See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9611(a) (West Supp. 1990). This authorization will expire in 1991.
For ease of reference, all references to CERCLA will be to the section numbers as they appear in Title 42 of
the United States Code, rather than to the sections of the Act as originally enacted or reauthorized. CERCLA
and its amendments are also commonly know as "Superfund."
2. United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24 (Ist Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 957 (1991).
3. Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied I I I S. Ct. 1017 (1991).
4. The other two courts of appeals' decisions are United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemi-
cal Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 484 U.S. 848 (1987), and New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985). The district court cases are listed infra notes 105 and 106.
5. See supra note I. Although CERCLA is ten years old, most of the litigation regarding CERCLA liability
has occurred in the last five years. In the early 1980s the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), was sur-
rounded by scandal and controversy. See R. GASKINs. ENVIRONMENTAL ACCIDENTS 231 (1989). See also, U.S.
Dep't Commerce, Environmental Protection Agency, A Management Review of the Superfund Program 2 (1989)
(PB90-153875) [hereinafter "EPA Management Review"] and thus little progress was made toward achieving the
goals of CERCLA in its early years. See, EPA Management Review at 2. For a recent review of the "ten years"
of Superfund litigation, see Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 45 Bus. LAW. 923 (1990).
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The concept of limited liability is discussed briefly in Part I. Part II dis-
cusses the two traditional exceptions to the rule of limited liability, piercing the
corporate veil and the "corporate actor" rule. When a corporation is liable
under CERCLA, these traditional exceptions continue to provide grounds for
shareholder liability. The government must be cautious in using the traditional
theories, however, since other creditors may follow the government's lead and
may also recover against the shareholder, which could reduce the government's
recovery. Some guidelines are suggested for when the government should and
should not pursue shareholders on traditional bases.
Part III explains the statutory scheme of CERCLA and analyzes the cases
that have considered direct shareholder liability. Part IV suggests and analyzes
three inquiries which courts should make in any action brought against a share-
holder directly under CERCLA. First, a traditional statutory analysis concludes
that shareholders can be held liable directly under CERCLA. Second, the inter-
play between CERCLA and limited liability shows that CERCLA liability is
not subject to the state-based rule of limited liability. The federal courts have
the power to create federal common law, and in so doing must create uniform
rules of decisions in CERCLA cases independent of state law. To the extent
CERCLA conflicts with the rule of limited liability, CERCLA should prevail.
Third, the factors relevant to setting the parameters of direct shareholder liabil-
ity under CERCLA are discussed. Since Congress will decide whether to
reauthorize CERCLA within the year,6 it should also consider clarifying the
liability provisions.7
I. INTRODUCTION: LIMITED LIABILITY FOR SHAREHOLDERS
While most courts have held that a shareholder can be held directly liable
under CERCLA, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
cently refused to do so by basing its holding on the state law based principle of
limited liability.8 Thus, a tension now exists in the cases between the concept of
limited liability and direct imposition of liability on shareholders under CER-
CLA. Furthermore, in the absence of direct CERCLA liability, limited liability
6. See supra note I.
7. The focus is on the closely held corporation and it makes no difference whether the limited number of
shareholders are individuals or another corporation as in the parent/subsidiary relationship. Courts have not dis-
tinguished between the liability of shareholders who are individuals and those who are corporations. Most courts
see the two as virtually identical. See United States v. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1203 (E.D. Pa. 1989); United
States v. McGraw-Edison Co., 718 F. Supp. 154, 156-57 (W.D.N.Y. 1989).
Persons other than shareholders may be liable under CERCLA. Officers and directors and even certain em-
ployees may fit within a liability category. Indeed, many of the concepts discussed in this Article can be applied to
those other persons (such as the test for determining whether one is an "operator"). Shareholder liability, how-
ever. presents a number of unique problems. First, some shareholders have the absolute power to control the
corporation's activities by virtue of the amount of their stock ownership. While other persons only have the control
given them by their job description or other authority, a majority shareholder's ability to control comes with the
territory. Second, the special status given shareholders under state corporate laws with respect to limited liability
has resulted in a conflict among the courts considering this matter and needs to be resolved. Third, shareholder
liability, by definition, includes the problem of parent/subsidiary relationships.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 158-70.
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provides the protective shield which must be "pierced" in some way or another
to hold shareholders liable for the acts of their corporations.
The origin of corporations is obscure9 and it is unclear whether limited
liability was part of the early corporate form.10 In the United States the corpo-
rate form has always been a creature of the legislature and not a part of the
common law." Limited liability has been a standard part of the statutory cor-
porate form since the mid 1800s12 and remains a fundamental part of corporate
law.
The effects of limited liability on both the business community and on soci-
ety continue to be debated as part of the question of whether limited liability is
a desirable attribute of modern corporate law. The traditional wisdom held that
limited liability served to promote the industrial revolution, but even its neces-
sity to the success of the industrial revolution in the United States has been
questioned.13
Limited liability is generally believed to encourage investment and thereby
promote commercial and industrial growth.' 4 Most contemporary writers who
defend the rule of limited liability do so on the grounds that it encourages and
facilitates the trading of shares in the market,' 5 a justification applicable only to
publicly held corporations.'" Although the courts have not explicitly made the
distinction between publicly and closely held corporations, we see the effect of
the fundamental differences of these two corporate forms in cases involving
questions such as piercing the corporate veil. Veil piercing cases involve closely
held corporations.17
Some writers have suggested that limited liability should not apply to the
claims of "involuntary" creditors, i.e., those who cannot bargain with the corpo-
9. See J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE US. 1780-1970, 6-8 (1970);
Berle, Historical Inheritance of the Business Corporation, reprinted in SOCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS
(Cahn ed. 1952). See also, I F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND. HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 486-511, which shows the
uncertain pedigree of the corporate form (2d ed. 1968).
10. See E. DODD. AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, 373-76 (1954); Dodd, The Evolution of
Limited Liability in American Industry: Massachusetts, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1351, 1351 and n.I, 1356-57 (1948);
See also Kessler, With Limited Liability for All: Why Not a Partnership Corporation? 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 235
(1967) who concludes that limited liability was probably not a "natural corporate right." Id. at 240. See infra
notes 171-78 and accompanying text for a further discussion of the corporate form and limited liability.
II. J. HURST, supra note 9, at 8-9; 1. WORMSER. FRANKENSTEIN INCORPORATED 15, 17 (1931).
12. E. DODD. supra note 10, at 472-82.
13. See Dodd, supra note 10, at 1378-79.
14. See Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 371 (1981) and authorities cited
therein.
15. One such justification is that limited liability supports and advances investment in enterprises by large
numbers of investors and facilitates the trading of shares in the market. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited
Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89-101 (1985); Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affili-
ated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499 (1976); Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics,
53 VA. L. REV. 259, 262-63 (1967).
Others have criticized this view. See Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4
DEL J. CORP. L. 351, 358-59 (1979); Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and
Damages, 99 HARV. L. REV. 986 (1986) (arguing that several of the contemporary rationales for limited liability
do not apply to the parent/subsidiary relationship).
16. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15.
17. Barber, supra note 14, at 372. See also Easterbrook & Fisehel, supra note 15, at 109 and n.37 (saying
that "[a]lmost every case" involving veil piercing has involved a closely held corporation and then explaining that
they limited their statement to "almost" because all cases had not been examined).
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ration before the debt to them arises. 18 These involuntary creditors include tort
creditors and creditors such as the United States or a state government holding
claims for the cleanup of contaminated sites. A lender can choose not to lend to
the corporation. The lender can compensate for limited liability by increasing
the interest rate it charges, or by having the shareholders guarantee the loans to
the corporation. Additionally, a lender can negotiate security for its loan. Tort
creditors do not have these choices. 19 They have no opportunity to bargain with
the corporation and make an informed choice whether to "lend" to the corpora-
tion. Arguably, exceptions to the rule of limited liability should be applied more
readily to the nonconsensual creditor, allowing recovery from the shareholders.
In the CERCLA context, however, courts have not usually distinguished tort
claims from contract claims and some courts have explicitly refused to recog-
nize any difference. 20
II. SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY FOR CLEANUP UNDER PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE LAW: PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL AND THE
"CORPORATE ACTOR" RULE
Exceptions to the rule of limited liability have existed almost as long as the
rule itself. There are two traditional exceptions to limited liability that are po-
tentially applicable for shareholder liability for the cleanup of sites contami-
nated with hazardous substances: 1) piercing the corporate veil; and 2) the
"corporate actor" rule. 2'
A. Piercing the Corporate Veil
The most well known exception to the rule of limited liability is that of
piercing the corporate veil, which allows a court to disregard the corporate form
and impose liability upon the owners of a corporation. The shareholders become
liable for the acts of the corporation.
Courts have pierced the veil usually when the corporation is closely held.22
In the CERCLA context all of the veil piercing cases to date have involved a
closely held corporation in which the shareholder was another corporation (a
parent/subsidiary relationship). Although the courts have not based their deci-
sions on the fact that the shareholder is another corporation it is worth keeping
18. See. e.g., Manne, supra note 15, at 263; Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 15, at 364-67; Barber,
supra note 14, at 390; Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts of Their Corporations? 76
YALE LJ. 1190 (1967). Others suggest that the problems of involuntary creditors need to be solved by other
methods. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 15, at 519-20 (suggesting that those engaged in a dangerous activity be
required to post a bond to cover tort liability).
19. For a discussion of some of these issues see Note, supra note 18. State governments do have the option of
enacting statutes providing them with liens for environmental claims. For some of the limitations on the current
usefulness of these liens see infra note 88.
20. See, e.g., In re Acushnet River and New Bedford Harbor Proceedings: Re Alleged PCB Pollution, 675 F.
Supp. 22, 31-32 (D. Mass. 1987).
21. This term was created by the author of Note, Officer and Shareholder Liability Under CERCLA: United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co., Inc., 34 WASH. UJ. URB. & CONTEMp. L. 461, 474-71
(1988) [hereinafter "Northeastern"].
22. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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this fact in mind. For the most part, however, these cases are treated here as
one category of the closely held corporation.23
1. Applicable Law
Courts develop "federal common law" when a case is based on a federal
statute or other federal interest.24 In developing this federal common law the
courts may adopt state law or create a federal rule of decision. 25 In the CER-
CLA context most courts have said explicitly that they are developing a federal
rule of decision in the interest of national uniformity rather than adopting state
law veil piercing principles.28 Having thus decided to create a federal rule, these
courts have nonetheless noted that there is little difference between state law
and the evolving federal law on the standards necessary to pierce a corporate
veil.27 Nonetheless, the courts have the ability to develop a uniform federal rule
instead of applying rules that might vary from state to state.
23. One difference between the corporate shareholder and the individual shareholder is a practical matter of
proof. When an individual is a shareholder and performs an act, it can be identified as an act of that individual as
well as an act on behalf of the corporation. When a parent and a subsidiary share officers, directors, or managers,
it may be difficult to prove that they acted for the parent in addition to acting for the subsidiary.
Several commentators analyze the parent/subsidiary cases as a separate group. See Barber, supra note 14, at
373, 399; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15, at 109-11.
Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel defend on economic grounds this preference of the courts to pierce a
veil only in cases of closely held corporations or parent/subsidiary relationships and find additional economic
reasons why the veil should be pierced in parent/subsidiary cases. Id.
24. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARv. L. REV. 883, 950-53 (1986).
Federal common law is discussed in more detail regarding the interplay between state and federal law. See infra
text accompanying note 340. For a discussion of veil piercing under federal standards generally see Note, Piercing
the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1982).
25. See infra text accompanying note 340.
26. Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1248 (D. N.J. 1991). City of N.Y. v. Exxon Corp., 112
Bankr. 540, 552-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 19-20 (D.R.I, 1989)
affd. in part 910 F.2d 24 (lst Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 11l S. Ct. 957 (1991); United States v, Nicolet, 712 F.
Supp. 1193, 1201-02 (E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Acushnet River and New Bedford Harbor: Proceedings Re Alleged
PCB Pollution, 675 F. Supp. 22, 30-31 (D. Mass. 1987) [hereinafter "In re Acushnet River"]. In Joslyn Mfg. Co.
v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, IIl S. Ct. 1017 (1991) the court did not
discuss the question of whether state law or federal common law applied. The court followed an earlier Fifth
Circuit decision, which the district court had pointed out was based on Texas law, but which was based on the veil
piercing standards developed in that circuit. (Joslyn, 696 F. Supp. 222, 227, and which the lower court said was
applicable to its reasoning whether state or a federal common law applied. 696 F. Supp. 222, 226 n.8.)
In re Acushnet River had an added wrinkle to the question of the choice of law in the veil piercing question.
The parent corporation did not have the minimum contacts with the forum state (Massachusetts) necessary to
establish personal jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction existed only if the veil was pierced and the parent was treated
as the alter ego of the subsidiary since the subsidiary had the requisite contacts. The defendant/parent argued
that since personal jurisdiction was based on the state long-arm statute, state law should apply to the piercing
question. 675 F. Supp. at 30. The court disagreed that jurisdiction could be exercised only over those who would
be subject to the jurisdiction of the state court. Id. It also disagreed with the argument that a state court deciding
the veil piercing issue under CERCLA could apply state law. The court held federal law controls the veil piercing
issue in a CERCLA action. Id. at 30-31.
27. United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 20 (D.R.I. 1989), affd in part 910 F.2d 24 (1st
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 957 (1991); United States v. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1201-02 (E.D. Pa.
1989); and In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. 22, 33 (D. Mass. 1987).
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2. Traditional Tests for Piercing the Corporate Veil
Those who have studied limited liability and the piercing doctrine generally
agree that the issues as they have been analyzed and applied by the courts defy
easy understanding. 28
Courts and commentators often cite two main factors used to decide
whether to pierce a corporate veil: 29 1) disrespect for the corporate form, such
as failure to observe corporate formalities by the shareholder; and 2) indications
of fraud or inequity.30 Yet these standards remain vague and courts and com-
mentators alike do not apply the standards in any consistent manner.31 Further,
it is unclear whether both factors or only one must be met before the court can
pierce the veil, although the commentators indicate both should be present.
32
3. Piercing the Corporate Veil in CERCLA Cases
Only a few of the many cases concerning shareholder liability under CER-
CLA have considered the question of piercing the corporate veil. Upon first
review of the cases, one might have the impression that veil piercing in CER-
CLA cases is a subset of veil piercing generally. That is, for the most part, the
courts have followed or adopted traditional veil piercing standards 33 and have
refused to adopt an easier standard for veil piercing in the CERCLA context.
However, a closer examination of the cases shows that a federal rule specific to
CERCLA cases is developing. The district courts have a new focus to their
28. As Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fisehel have remarked, "'Piercing' seems to happen freakishly. Like
lightening, it is rare, severe, and unprincipled. There is a consensus that the whole area of limited liability, and
conversely of piercing the corporate veil, is among the most confusing in corporate law." Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 15, at 89 (footnote omitted).
Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel examine both limited liability and the piercing doctrine from an
economic perspective. With respect to veil piercing, they conclude that it is an attempt by courts to "balance the
benefits of limited liability against its costs." Id. at 109. When limited liability offers few benefits, but creates a
"high probability that a firm will engage in a socially excessive level of risk taking," the court is more likely to
pierce the veil. Id. See also Epperson & Canny, The Capital Shareholder's Ultimate Calamity: Pierced Corpo-
rate Veils and Shareholder Liability in The District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia, 37 CATH. U.L. REV.
605. 612-13 (1988).
29. Since many commentators have explored the general subject of piercing the corporate veil, this discussion
is intended to provide a brief background for the following discussion of the rule of piercing the corporate veil in
CERCLA cases.
30. See Epperson & Canny, supra note 28, at 612-13; Barber, supra note 14, at 376; Note, supra note 24, at
854.
31. For example, some view inadequate capitalization as a fact that will show that unfairness or inequity
exists, that is, an indication that the second factor is present. See Barber, supra note 14. at 386; Epperson &
Canny. supra note 28, at 613; Note, supra note 24, at 854-55. Others view inadequate capitalization as an inde-
pendent factor that has been considered by the courts. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 15, at 354-55.
The tests and results in veil piercing cases vary widely in the three adjoining judicial districts: the District of
Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia. Epperson & Canny, supra note 28.
32. The commentators set forth this as a two-prong test and have indicated that both prongs must be met.
See Barber, supra note 14, at 376-77 (but also suggesting that in the parent/subsidiary context some courts have
focused primarily on the first prong. Id. at 397-99) and Note, supra note 24, at 854-55. However, the courts have
not been so diligent. See. e.g., Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1052, setting forth the two prongs in the disjunctive in a
case involving an individual shareholder.
33. For example, courts include in their general discussion of veil piercing such traditional bases as fraud.
See, e.g.. United States v. Nicolet. Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (principles of equity); United States v.
Kayser-Roth, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989); United States v. Exxon, 112 Bankr. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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inquiry: whether there was "pervasive control" by the shareholder over the cor-
poration. The test and the factors that the courts have used to determine the
element of pervasive control provide more guidance to attorneys, clients, and
governmental plaintiffs than do traditional veil piercing principles.
The only court of appeals to address the question of veil piercing in the
CERCLA context 34 was the Fifth Circuit in Joslyn Manufacturing Company v.
T.L. James & Company, Inc.35 The court said a corporate veil should only be
pierced when the corporate form "is used as a sham to perpetrate a fraud or
avoid personal liability."3 6 It followed an earlier decision which had focused on
the control the parent exercised over the subsidiary.37 Specifically, the court
said the veil could be pierced if there were " 'total domination of the subservient
corporation.' "38 Since the lower court had appropriately reviewed all of the
facts and found such control lacking, the court affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion to refuse to pierce the veil. Specifically, the facts showed that corporate
formalities had been observed, such as keeping separate books and records,
holding shareholder and director's meetings, keeping separate the daily opera-
tions of parent and subsidiary, and the subsidiary owned its own property, filed
separate tax returns, and paid its own bills.39
One of the earliest cases to consider in depth the question of whether to
pierce a corporate veil was In re Acushnet River,40 which involved a well capi-
talized, fairly independent subsidiary. The government urged the court to ease
the standard for veil piercing in this CERCLA case and argued that the veil
should be pierced whenever a parent owns 100 percent of a subsidiary and there
is a "significant degree of involvement" in the subsidiary's affairs. 4' The court
refused to ease the standards for veil piercing. The court held a parent should
be permitted to rely on traditional principles of corporate law to acquire and use
productively a waste site by "creating a well capitalized, nonfraudulent, sepa-
rate corporate subsidiary. '42 Adopting the government's test for veil piercing
would annul the effect of corporate law and would put parent companies at risk
34. One circuit court addressed the veil piercing issue in a case involving a mix of state law and CERCLA
issues. New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985). The question of whether the corporate veil
should be pierced arose in the context of a state law nuisance abatement claim. Id. The court did not address the
choice of law question, but it appropriately applied state law.
35. 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1017 (1991). The case is especially significant for
its refusal to impose direct liability on shareholders under CERCLA. See infra text accompanying notes 154-79.
36. 893 F.2d at 83.
37. Id. at 83-84.
38. Id. (quoting United States v. Jon-T Chem., Inc., 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1014 (1986)). See also Joslyn, 696 F. Supp. at 227.
39. 893 F.2d at 83. Whether a subsidiary filed its own tax returns from the period 1935 to 1950 (the period
of time concerned in Joslyn) does not help determine one way or the other whether the corporation was being
treated as the alter ego of the parent. During that time period, consolidated tax returns were sometimes filed by
related companies, at other times they were not permitted and at times there was a surcharge (as high as 2% of
the consolidated taxable income) for the privilege of filing consolidated returns. See J. MERTENS. LAW OF FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION § 46.02 (1990). In any case, the decision whether to file a joint return is one driven
almost entirely by the resulting tax consequences.
40. 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987).
41. Id. at 31-32.
42. Id. at 32.
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for any subsidiaries which they were "more than passively interested in.' 43
Overall, the Court showed great deference to the presumption of limited liabil-
ity' 4 and looked to traditional veil piercing standards to determine whether it
should pierce the veil or not.
First, the court referred to the general principle found in federal veil pierc-
ing cases: "that 'a corporate entity may be disregarded in the interests of public
convenience, fairness and equity.'"-4 Second, the court went on to list seven
factors applied by other federal courts considering whether to pierce the veil 4"
and singled out the factor of "pervasive control. '47 The court said it was consid-
ering the policies of CERCLA in deciding which factors were important.'8
In In re Acushnet River, the parent had formed the subsidiary in order to
purchase assets that might be subject to liability under CERCLA .4  Yet the
subsidiary had a significant net worth and had remained profitable." In this
respect, this case is vastly different from the case in which the veil piercing
question is usually raised, i.e., when the corporation cannot pay its debts. The
subsidiary apparently had substantial assets. Further, it never paid a dividend to
the parent, it operated on its own, it negotiated its own contracts and loans,
controlled its relationships with its employees, had a separate financial status,
and observed certain corporate formalities." On the other hand, a few factors
weighed in favor of piercing including: (1) the failure to formalize loan agree-
ments between the parent and subsidiary; (2) the need for parental consent
before a large capital expenditure was made by the subsidiary; (3) the parent
required the subsidiary to change some accounting procedures; (4) the subsidi-
ary generated financial forecasts for the parent and provided financial reports;
and (5) the parent's initials were included on the subsidiary's logos. 52 Neverthe-
less, the court held that there must be more "integration" between the two cor-
porations to justify piercing.53
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., 675 F. Supp. at 35. "If limited liability is to remain the rule and not the exception, then this
generally accepted structure ought not to be torn down absent statutory authorization." Id.
45. Id. at 33 (quoting Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215, 221 (Ist Cir. 1981)).
46. Specifically the court listed the following factors: "(I) inadequate capitalization .... (2) extensive or
pervasive control by the shareholder or shareholders, (3) intermingling of the corporation's properties or accounts
with those of its owner, (4) failure to observe corporate formalities and separateness, (5) siphoning of funds from
the corporation, (6) absence of corporate records, and (7) nonfunctioning officers or directors." Id. (emphasis
added). All of these factors need not be present to pierce the corporate veil and the determination must be made
on a case by case basis. Id.
47. Id. at 34.
48. Id. at 33.
49. Id. at 34.
50. Id. at 35. The net worth of the subsidiary at the time of the suit was $17 million; five times what it had
been when the parent acquired it. Id. It is, therefore, somewhat unclear why the government was attempting to
recover from the parent. The veil piercing argument was raised in connection with the question of whether the
court had personal jurisdiction over the parent. Thus, perhaps, the government had included the parent in the suit
since it believed the parent might be responsible under CERCLA and then had to argue the veil piercing issue
early on to establish personal jurisdiction. (The government did not raise a claim against the parent directly under
CERCLA, in which personal jurisdiction could also have been argued.).
51. Id.
52, Id. at 34.
53. Id.
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In deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil, the court in United States
v. Nicolet, Inc."4 first considered the general principle that a veil should be
pierced to prevent fraud or injustice or to respect public policy. 5 The court then
went on to specify a federal rule particular to veil piercing in the CERCLA
context:
Where a subsidiary is or was at the relevant time a member of one of the classes of
persons potentially liable under CERCLA; and the parent had a substantial financial
or ownership interest in the subsidiary; and the parent corporation controls or at the
relevant time controlled the management and operations of the subsidiary, the parent's
separate corporate existence may be disregarded.56
In Nicolet, the court denied the parent's motion for summary judgment.
The pleadings alleged that the parent initially held a majority and later all of
the subsidiary's stock. The parent had "actively participated in the manage-
ment" of the subsidiary at the contaminated site during the time of the im-
proper disposal, knew the subsidiary's disposal practices, had the "capacity to
control the disposal and resultant release and to abate damages from the re-
leases,. . ." and had benefited from the improper disposal.5 7 The court held that
these facts would be sufficient if proven at trial to pierce the corporate veil.58
The court in United States v. Kayser-Roth59 used a general test for veil
piercing, saying that the veil should be pierced in the "interest of public conve-
nience, fairness and equity." 60 In deciding whether to pierce the veil the court
focused on the "overwhelming pervasive control" that the parent exercised over
the subsidiary.61 Specifically, the parent controlled the environmental matters of
the subsidiary, it filled most of the officer and director positions of the subsidi-
ary with its own personnel, it approved all expenditures over 5,000 dollars, and
it had almost total financial and operational control over the subsidiary. 2 As a
result of this "pervasive control" by the parent, the corporate veil was pierced.
Recently, the First Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed Kayser-Roth, but did not
consider the veil piercing issue.6 3 The court affirmed the district court's decision
54. 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
55. Id. at 1202. Specifically the court said:
The federal common law in this area emerges from the general principle that "the appropriate occasion
for disregarding the corporate existence occurs when the court must prevent fraud, illegality or injustice,
or when recognition of the corporate entity would defeat public policy or shield someone from liability for
a crime."
(Citing American Bell, Inc. v. Federation of Tel. Workers, 736 F.2d 879, 886 (3d Cir. 1984). which quoted an
earlier case).
56. Id. at 1202.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989), arid in part, 910 F.2d 24 (Ist Cir. 1990), cert. denied, II I S. Ct. 957
(1991). See infra text accompanying notes 185-96.
60. Id. at 23. The court also recited the seven factors set out in In re Acushnet River, but it viewed these
specific factors as adding "flesh" to the more general test quoted in the text. Id. at 20.
61. Id. at 24.
62. Id. at 24. For a complete "laundry list" of all of the specific controls placed on the subsidiary by the
parent see infra text accompanying note 196.
63. 910 F.2d 24 (Ist Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991).
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with respect to direct shareholder liability and said that it was unnecessary to
rule on the veil piercing question. 4
Although the court in United States v. Exxon Corp.65 said it did not have
to reach the issue of veil piercing, 6 it went on to find that the requirements for
piercing the corporate veil were met. The court looked both to the general prin-
ciple of veil piercing to safeguard the "interests of public convenience, fairness
and equity'6 as well as the seven specific factors set out in In re Acushnet
River. The court relied on three facts in reaching the conclusion to pierce the
veil. First, the parent corporation had pervasive control over and involvement in
the affairs of the subsidiary. 68 Second, the parent was aware of the disposal
activities of the subsidiary.69 Third, there was a failure to respect corporate
formalities-a traditional factor supporting veil piercing.70 These latter two fac-
tors are, in a sense, further indications of control.
Three of the five cases considering the veil piercing question, In re
Acushnet River, Kayser-Roth and Exxon singled out the factor of "pervasive
control" as the key factor in CERCLA piercing cases.71 The other two cases
also considered control as a key factor, although they did not use the phrase
"pervasive control." The court in Joslyn relied on an earlier case the focal point
of which was control.7 2 The court in Nicolet included in its test for piercing the
veil in the CERCLA context that the parent "controlled the management and
operations of the subsidiary. 1' 3 In each case, the court focused on the actual
control exerted by the shareholder over the corporation (in each case the parent
over the subsidiary), not the mere ability to control.
Three of these courts found that the parent had exercised a sufficient level
of control. In Kayser-Roth and Exxon the courts pierced the corporate veil.7 4 In
Nicolet the court denied summary judgment for the shareholder.
From these cases we can begin to discern a rule specific to CERCLA cases:
a court will pierce the corporate veil when a shareholder has pervasive control
over the corporation. In determining this "pervasive control," courts have been
particularly interested in the control shareholders have actually exercised over
corporate finances and operations. The specific factors that appear in several of
the decisions are: the amount of shares owned (in each case, a majority), the
64. Id. at 28, n.1 1.
65. 112 Bankr. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
66. Id. at 552. The court held a parent corporation directly liable under CERCLA as an "arranger" and a
"transporter" since the parent had actively participated in and had the authority to control these activities. Id. at
546-52. See infra text accompanying notes 307-13.
67. 112 Bankr. at 553 (quoting Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215, 221 (Ist Cir. 1981)).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Specifically, the board of directors of the subsidiary never met, there was a lack of corporate separateness
and there were various financial controls over the subsidiary. Id.
71. In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. 22, 33; United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp.. 724 F. Supp. 15, 23, 24
(D.R.I 1989); and New York v. Exxon, 112 Bankr. at 553.
72. 893 F.2d at 84, cert. denied, I II S. Ct. 1017 (1991) (see also the district court opinion 696 F. Supp. at
227).
73. United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. at 1202.
74. The court in Exxon said it would pierce the veil although it said it need not reach the issue. 112 Bankr.
at 552.
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appointment or placement of directors and management personnel, financial
control (especially the borrowing of money, accounting supervision, payment of
bills, collection of accounts receivable, and the approval of expenditures), con-
trol over certain aspects of the subsidiary's operation, control over certain types
of transactions (such as purchase or movement of capital assets, all real estate
transactions whether purchase, sale or lease) and some control over or aware-
ness of environmental matters.75
The veil piercing test in CERCLA cases is both tied to the past and a step
forward. It is tied to the traditional test in that courts considering the piercing
question generally refer first to the purpose of veil piercing as one of preventing
fraud or inequity. In addition, like traditional tests, the CERCLA test requires
courts to decide veil piercing questions on a case by case basis looking closely at
the facts of each. The new test breaks with the past since it does not adhere to
the traditional two-prong test, which required not only fraud or inequity but
also a showing of the disrespect for the corporate form. This does not mean the
test is less rigorous. It does mean that the test is more specific to CERCLA. In
developing a uniform rule of decision for piercing the corporate veil in CER-
CLA cases, it is appropriate to consider the policies of the statute.76 Congress
intended to place the costs of cleanup on those who were "responsible" for the
disposal. 7 Generally, a shareholder who exercises so much control over the cor-
poration that the control is for all practical purposes complete, or "pervasive,"
may be considered "responsible" for the disposal. Thus, the new test is consis-
tent with the legislative intent.
4. Viability of Veil Piercing in CERCLA Cases
Of the twenty or more reported cases concerning shareholder liability for
CERCLA claims, only five have considered the question of veil piercing.78 In
75. In Exxon, the court recited the following factors: amount of stock owned (all), power to appoint officers
and directors, common officers and directors, funding of salaries, authority over "major" expenditures, negotia-
tions of certain transactions, loan guarantees, funding of operations, contact with customers, and paying for insur-
ance coverage. Id. at 549 (incorporated into the piercing question at 553). In Kayser-Roth, the court recited the
factors of: monetary control, budget restrictions, control over certain transactions (government contacts, including
environmental matters), approval of real estate transactions (leases, purchases and sales), approval of expenditures
over $5,000, placement of management and director personnel. 724 F. Supp. at 22. In Nicolet, the court was more
general, referring to the facts of: majority shareholder status, participation in the management of the site while
toxic materials were being disposed, familiarity with disposal practices, "capacity to control" and "ability to
abate" damages from the disposal, and benefit to the shareholder from the disposal practices. 712 F. Supp. at
1202-03.
76. In developing uniform rules that relate to a specific statute, it is necessary to consider and attempt to
further the goals and purposes of the underlying statute. Courts have recognized the specific need to consider the
purpose of CERCLA in developing the standards for veil piercing. See, e.g., In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at
22, 32-33 (D. Mass. 1987).
77. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1, 33, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 6119, 6136, The meaning of "responsible" as used by Congress is discussed infra text accompanying notes
323-24.
78. Other courts have considered the veil piercing question in passing. See, e.g., United States v. Carolawn,
14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,698 (D.S.C. 1984) (seemingly confusing veil piercing and the corporate
actor rule, but in either event allowing the matter to be tried) and United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898,
914 (D.N.H. 1985) (it was not necessary for the government to raise the piercing issue since liability could rest on
other grounds), United States v. McGraw-Edison Co., 718 F. Supp. 154 (W.D.N.Y. 1989).
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two cases the court actually pierced the corporate veil" and in one other the
court allowed the government to pursue the issue at trial by denying summary
judgment for the shareholder.8 0 The other two courts refused to pierce the cor-
porate veil given the facts presented. 8'
Veil piercing is often unnecessary in a CERCLA case. In fact, in some
cases piercing the corporate veil will actually hurt the government's ability to
recover. First, a case which presents facts supporting veil piercing will often also
support direct liability under CERCLA. 2 All three courts that pierced the cor-
porate veil or allowed the issue to be tried, (Kayser-Roth, Nicolet, and Exxon)
also imposed liability on the shareholders directly under CERCLA.83 Other
courts have explicitly avoided the question of piercing the veil when they im-
posed liability directly upon shareholders under CERCLA.84
Second, the government pays both a small price and a large price for pur-
suing a piercing claim. The small price is the cost of the additional litigation.
Since the CERCLA statute imposes liability directly on the shareholder in
many cases, it makes the difficult task of piercing the veil unnecessary in those
cases. The large price is that the government may have to share the assets of
the shareholder with all or some of the other creditors. By piercing the corpo-
rate veil, the government paves the way for other creditors to pierce the corpo-
rate veil. Other creditors may assert the doctrine of collateral estoppel or "issue
preclusion" to impose liability on the shareholder under a veil piercing theory. 5
79. United States v. Kayser-Roth, Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989). aff'd, 910 F.2d 24 (Ist Cir. 1990).
cert. denied, I I I S. Ct. 957 (1991) and United States v. Exxon, 112 Bankr. 540, partial summary judgment
granted, 744 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see supra text accompanying notes 59-64 and 65-70, respectively.
80. United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989); see supra text accompanying notes
54-58.
81. Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80,83 (1990), cert. denied, I II S. Ct. 1017 (1991); In re
Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987).
82. If a shareholder is so involved with the activities of the corporation so as to have "pervasive control" it is
also likely that in many jurisdictions the shareholder will be liable as an "operator" directly under CERCLA. See
Infra Parts III and IV.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 185-96, 232-42, 307-13.
84. United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 744 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied484
U.S. 848 (1987). United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 913 (D.N.H. 1983).
While recognizing the favor accorded limited liability and expressing respect for it, another district court
suggested that it is more appropriate to disregard the corporate form in the CERCLA context than in others.
Rather than pierce the corporate veil, however, the court went on to impose liability directly under CERCLA.
Kelley v. Arco Indus. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 n.2 (W.D. Mich. 1989); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727
F. Supp. 1532, 1542 n.4 (W.D. Mich. 1989); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1554, 1560 n.4 (W.D.
Mich. 1989). See infra text accompanying notes 263-77.
85. The Supreme Court permitted the "offensive" use of collateral estoppel in Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-33 (1979). See generally, C. WRIGHT. THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 685-88 (4th ed.
1983); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, § 29 (1982).
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Even if the court will not permit the use of this doctrine,86 the record has been
made by the government, making the task of those to follow that much easier.8
If other creditors are successful in piercing the corporate veil (following the
government's lead) and the shareholder has insufficient assets to pay all of these
claims the government will recover less because it must share with other credi-
tors.88 Had the government pursued its claim directly under CERCLA, liability
would have been imposed on the shareholder for the government's claim only,
thus assuring a greater recovery than if the government had to share with other
creditors. Therefore, a piercing argument should be made by the government
only when it cannot impose liability directly under CERCLA. Most notably, the
government cannot pursue a direct liability claim in the Fifth Circuit since that
Court of Appeals has refused to recognize such a cause of action under CER-
CLA. Other examples are when the facts do not support imposing liability di-
rectly on the shareholder as an "owner or operator," "arranger," or "trans-
porter," all of which are discussed in the next part.
Thus, rather than making every argument possible against a shareholder,
the government must evaluate its case carefully and choose selectively the argu-
ments it will make in order to maximize recovery on its claim. If the govern-
ment decides to pursue the veil piercing question because CERCLA liability is
unavailable or uncertain in a given case, it should evaluate the available assets
of the shareholder and the extent of the other debts of the shareholder. If the
shareholder has significant assets, and is able to pay all of the corporate credi-
tors, pursuing the piercing claim is appropriate. If, on the other hand, the share-
holder has limited assets, the government must consider whether it can obtain a
86. For example, the court can refuse to allow the creditor to use issue preclusion if the decision could be
supported on alternative grounds. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 85, at 682. The cases that pierced the corporate veil
also impose liability directly on the shareholder under the CERCLA provisions. Thus, an alternative ground for
liability was present in these cases. In addition, courts are generally given broad discretion to determine when to
use the doctrine. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-33 (1979). Parklane also sets forth three
factors courts should consider in deciding whether to apply the doctrine. Id.
87. Although factors supporting veil piercing will often also support a direct claim under CERCLA, the
reverse is not necessarily true. Those few cases which pierced the veil had very compelling facts fully supporting
"pervasive control." One form of direct liability under CERCLA. however, requires that one be sufficiently in-
volved to be the "operator" of the contaminated site or "facility." See infra text accompanying notes 122-23.
Activities proving control over the facility might not be sufficient to support veil piercing since the facility is often
only one portion of the corporation. Thus, the case will do little to aid creditors in using the facts as proved by the
government to pierce the veil. On the other hand, several courts have looked at the shareholder's involvement in
the corporation to determine "operator" liability and those facts once established by the government may aid
other creditors in a veil piercing theory.
Finally, the standards for direct liability under CERCLA may be easier to meet than veil piercing standards.
Therefore, holding a shareholder liable as an operator due to her involvement in the corporation generally may not
be sufficient to support a veil piercing theory. The diligent creditor, nonetheless, can use this initial proof as a
start.
88. This assumes that the government has no special priority rights or liens that would enable it to prevail
over the shareholder's other creditors. CERCLA does provide a lien for cleanup costs, but it only applies to real
estate and may be of limited value in pursuing the assets of the shareholder if the veil is pierced. 42 U.S.C.A. §
9607(l)(1) (West Supp. 1990). Further, the lien is subject to preexisting liens and it is possible that another
creditor could follow the government in piercing the corporate veil and then move quickly to file or perfect its lien
before the government properly filed its own. The other creditor would win under § 9607(l)(3). Several states
have "superlien" statutes, giving governments varying rights to the assets of a person responsible for cleanup.
While some might allow the government to have the first priority, others suffer from some of the same problems as
the federal lien.
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lien on the shareholder's property and must evaluate the priority of that lien
since its recovery will be otherwise reduced by the other outstanding debt. Ab-
sent the availability of a lien the government must consider whether its claim
will have priority over other general unsecured claims and, if so, the extent of
the unsecured assets.89 In the event the shareholder is or will become insolvent
the government should evaluate what percentage of the total debt of the share-
holder its claim comprises. Even if the shareholder has other debt, if the govern-
ment's claim is a significant amount of the total debt and there are assets from
which to pay a good portion of the debts, the government will receive the lion's
share of the assets by virtue of the size of its claim in any insolvency proceed-
ing.90 In such a case it is worthwhile to pursue the piercing claim.
B. The "Corporate Actor" Rule
Courts have developed another exception to the general rule of limited lia-
bility. When a shareholder (or other individual associated with a corporation,
e.g., an officer) commits a tort or other wrongdoing on behalf of the corporation,
that individual can be held liable for his or her acts. This liability has been
called the "corporate actor" rule.91 The Second Circuit in New York v. Shore
Realty 92 held a shareholder/officer responsible as a corporate actor for a com-
mon law nuisance claim. An officer who "controls corporate conduct and thus is
an active participant in that conduct is liable for the torts of the corporation. 93
By focusing on the conduct of the shareholder/officer, the court imposed liabil-
ity on the individual without having to pierce the corporate veil.94 Similarly, in
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co.,95 the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals imposed liability on a shareholder/officer using a com-
bination of the corporate actor rule and direct CERCLA liability as the person
who arranged for the disposal.96
In United States v. Mottolo,7 the court denied the shareholder's motion
for summary judgment since he might be responsible under state law for corpo-
rate torts if he "directed or personally participated in the tortious activity."98
Recently, in Quadion Corp. v. Mache,99 the court refused to dismiss an action
against shareholders who might "have actively participated or authorized the
disposal of" the hazardous substance. 100
89. The government may have priority over some or all of the other unsecured creditors, but if most of the
assets of the shareholder are fully secured, that priority will be of little practical value. Priority rights can be
found both in state law and in the Bankruptcy Code.
90. "Unsecured" creditors share on a pro rata basis in a bankruptcy proceeding. I I U.S.C. § 726(b) (1990).
91. Northeastern, supra note 21, at 464-71.
92. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
93. Id. at 1052.
94. Id. The Court explicitly avoided the veil piercing issue.
95. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
96. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 284-91.
97. 605 F. Supp. 898 (D.N.H. 1985).
98. Id. at 914.
99. 738 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. III. 1990).
100. Id. at 276.
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A fundamental difference exists between veil piercing and the corporate
actor rule. When a corporate veil is pierced, all of the owners of the corporation
are potentially liable to the creditor which successfully pierced the veil.' 0 ' When
one or a few shareholders, officers or other "actors" commit a wrongful act,
only they are responsible for liabilities resulting from that act.' 0 '
The rule has another limitation. The corporate actor rule applies only to
individuals who act wrongfully on behalf of a corporation and does not speak to
the responsibility of parent corporations for the acts of their subsidiaries. Fur-
ther, it applies only to those who actually committed the wrongdoing, not to
those who were in a position of control or who had the right to control the acts
of the corporation. Thus, recovery under the corporate actor rule is more limited
than under a veil piercing theory. Nonetheless, the corporate actor rule is im-
portant since it may serve as a basis of liability when other theories are not
supported by the facts.
As in the case of piercing the corporate veil, governments should proceed
with caution in asserting the corporate actor rule lest other creditors follow suit.
C. Summary: Piercing the Corporate Veil and the "Corporate Actor" Rule
Overall, both the corporate actor rule and the doctrine of piercing the cor-
porate veil have been of limited use in the CERCLA context. It is generally
easier for a court to impose liability directly under CERCLA. Nevertheless,
these two concepts are a well established part of corporate law and each has
been applied in a few cases in the CERCLA context. These concepts cannot be
overlooked by government attorneys as a means to impose liability on a share-
holder, although the benefits of these theories must be weighed against the
costs. Likewise they cannot be overlooked by corporate counsel in planning rela-
tions between shareholders and corporations or by attorneys advising their
shareholder and corporate clients about liability for hazardous waste contami-
nation. These doctrines will remain important when the facts do not support
direct shareholder liability under CERCLA or the jurisdiction does not recog-
nize direct CERCLA liability, such as presently in the Fifth Circuit.' 0 '
III. DIRECT SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
CERCLA imposes liability on certain persons for the cleanup of sites con-
taminated with toxic substances. Three circuit courts of appeals'0 4 and eight
101. One commentator asserts that, theoretically, liability should only be placed on those actively involved in
managing the corporation, but notes that courts have not distinguished between active and passive shareholders
except in dicta. See Barber, supra note 14, at 372-73.
102. This distinction is also discussed briefly in Northeastern, supra note 21, at 464-65.
103. Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied. III S. Ct. 1017
(1991), discussed infra text accompanying note 158.
104. United States v. Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d 24 (Ist Cir. 1990), cert. denied, I I I S. Ct. 957 (1991); United
States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
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district courts 0 5 have held shareholders liable for cleanup under CERCLA. An-
other ten district courts denied a shareholder/defendant's motion to dismiss or
for summary judgment on the grounds that the shareholder might be held liable
under CERCLA at a trial on the merits. 06 This liability is direct, not deriva-
tive. It is imposed because the shareholder falls within one of the categories of
persons who are statutorily liable, not because the corporation is responsible and
the veil has been pierced. One circuit court has recently disagreed with these
courts and has held that shareholders cannot be held liable directlyunder CER-
CLA because they are protected by the state rules of limited liability absent an
indication from Congress that CERCLA altered those rules. 107 The conflict
among the circuits focuses on the tension between CERCLA, as interpreted by
most courts, and traditional notions of corporate law. The crucial question is
whether CERCLA can be read to impose liability directly on shareholders or
whether it is subject to the state created rule of limited liability. If CERCLA
can be read to impose liability on shareholders, a second focus must be on what
tests are to be applied to determine whether particular shareholders are liable
and whether state law should be taken into consideration in creating the tests.
This part begins by discussing the statutory scheme established by CER-
CLA and then examines the circuit court and district court opinions.
A. Statutory Scheme
1. Introduction
The protection and restoration of our environment, particularly when haz-
ardous substances are concerned, has become a national concern and priority.10 8
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to clean up and otherwise protect the pub-
lic from sites contaminated with hazardous substances and to provide a fund to
105. City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 112 Bankr. 540, partial summary judgment granted, 744 F. Supp.
474 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); International Clinical Labs. Inc. v. Stevens, 710 F. Supp. 466 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); United
States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp 1298 (E.D. Mo. 1987), aff'd, 910 F.2d 24 (Ist Cir. 1990); United States v. Kayser-
Roth, 724 F. Supp 15 (D.R.I. 1989). affd 910 F.2d 24 (Ist Cir. 1990); Vermont v. Staco, 684 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.
Vt. 1988); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986); United States v. Northernaire Plating
Co., 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1989); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.N.C. 1985).
106. United States v. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F.
Supp. 1446 (W.D. Mich. 1988); Kelley v. Arco Indus. Corp., 721 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Mich. 1989); Kelley v.
Arco Indus. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1214 (W.D. Mich. 1989); United States v. McGraw Edison Co., 718 F. Supp.
154 (W.D.N.Y. 1989); United States v. Conservation Chem., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985); United States
v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,698 (D.S.C. 1984); United States v. Mottolo, 629 F. Supp.
56 (D.N.H. 1984).
107. Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 1017
(1991).
108. The most telling sign of this concern is the explosion in the number of programs and news stories about
various aspects of the environment and the future of the planet's health. One recent decision summarized the
problem as follows: "It is no secret that protection and preservation of the environment are at the forefront of our
national agenda. A fine illustration of this is Congress' enactment of CERCLA and the companion HSA [the
state legislation in the subject] legislation in California." Jensen v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 114 Bankr. 700,
706 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990).
The media attention given to Love Canal and other infamous sites in the late 1970s helped bring about this
national concern over toxic pollution. See, e.g., M. BROWN. LAYING WASTE: THE POISONING OF AMERICA BY
Toxic CHEMICALS (1980).
1991]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:133
support cleanup and related measures.109 Toxic substance contamination is
much greater than originally expected when CERCLA was passed in 1980.110
In 1989 the expected cost of cleaning up all sites on the then current National
Priorities List was 30 billion dollars." 1 Estimates place the total cost of cleanup
in the hundreds of billion dollar range." 2 Cleanup efforts will last well into the
next century, if not the century beyond.1" 3
To meet CERCLA's purpose, Congress established the "Hazardous Sub-
stance Superfund"' ' 14 and gave the federal government broad authority to
cleanup contaminated sites. Specifically, CERCLA authorizes the federal gov-
ernment in many cases to "remove or arrange for the removal" of hazardous
substances, to provide for "remedial action" and "to take any other response
measure." 15 The "Hazardous Substance Superfund" pays for the cleanup."16
The federal government will then attempt to replenish the Superfund by seeking
109. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 23, 25, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6126, 6128. See also remarks of Rep. Florio, 126 CONG. REC., pt. 24, 31,964 (1980).
CERCLA is in a sense a Congressional response to one type of a "mass tort." For a more general discussion
of the subject of shareholder liability when a corporation cannot pay for its past acts, see Roe, Bankruptcy and
Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1984); Green, Successor Liability: The Superpriority of Statutory Reform
to Protect Products Liability Claimants, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 17 (1986).
These articles, however, focus on how a large "mass tort" liability can be allocated in the future through the
division of the corporation's assets, successor liability and the like. For the most part, they do not consider share-
holder liability as it has been developed under CERCLA.
110. Congress thought the toxic waste problem was limited to several hundred sites around the country that
had been abandoned and needed to be cleaned up. EPA. A MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM,
I (1989). By 1989 over 30,000 sites had been "identified as possible candidates for Superfund." Id. at 2. Each
year approximately 2,000 sites are added to the list of sites to be evaluated. Id. at 1-7. Approximately 5 % of those
identified and evaluated are placed on the National Priorities List. Id. at 1-6. The current National Priorities List
contains 1,200 sites. It is expected to grow to 2,100 by the year 2000. Id. at 2, and pages 1-6 to 1-7. Given current
funding levels, the EPA can begin cleanup on about 40 sites per year. Another 50 per year are financed by
responsible persons (with EPA supervision). Id. at 1-7. Since some sites can take decades or even centuries to
cleanup, the cleanup of the country's hazardous waste sites will take a very long time. Id.
111. Id. at 3.
112. See R. GASKINs, ENVIRONMENTAL ACCIDENTS 64-65, 231 (1989) and authorities cited therein.
113. See supra note 110.
114. The "Hazardous Substance Superfund" is established pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 9507. Appropriations
from the fund for CERCLA are made pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9611 and 9612 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
With the 1986 amendments to CERCLA funding was increased to $8.5 billion to be allocated from the fund over
five years beginning in October 1986 for CERCLA purposes. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9611 (West Supp. 1990).
The sources of the fund include a general corporate tax, taxes on the import and export of petroleum and the
sale of certain chemicals, and appropriations from general revenues. 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 59(A), 9507. 4611, 4661.
4671 and 42 U.S.C.A. § 9611(P) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
115. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(a)(1) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990) provides:
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of such a release into
the environment, or (B) there is a release or substantial threat of release into the environment of any
pollutant or contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or
welfare, the President is authorized to act, consistent with the national contingency plan, to remove or
arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such hazardous substance, pollu-
tant, or contaminant at any time (including its removal from any contaminated natural resource), or take
any other response measure consistent with the national contingency plan which the President deems
necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the environment.
The President's authorization to undertake these tasks has been delegated to the EPA. Exec. Order No. 12,316,
46 Fed. Reg. 42, 237, reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 9615 at 544-46 (Aug. 14, 1981).
"The terms 'remove' or 'removal' mean the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the
environment" 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(23) (West Supp. 1990). "The terms 'remedy' or 'remedial action' means those
actions . . . to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate. . ." 42
U.S.C.A. § 9601(24) (West Supp. 1990). "Remove," "removal," "remedy," and "remedial action" are all in-
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recovery from persons responsible for the contamination. In the alternative, the
state or other party may pay for the cleanup'17 and then seek to recover directly
from those who are responsible."""
Establishing responsibility for the cost of cleanup is important for several
reasons. First, any funds collected from those responsible are used to reimburse
the "Hazardous Substance Superfund," making further cleanup and other
CERCLA activities possible. Second, the Environmental Protection Agency has
expressed a clear policy of seeking to negotiate settlements with those responsi-
ble for a cleanup to perform the cleanup.11 9 Establishing rules of liability en-
courages those who may be responsible under CERCLA to undertake
cleanup.12 0 Voluntary agreements free up funds to be used elsewhere and they
lower the administrative and judicial costs of first having the government per-
form the cleanup and then bring suit to recover its costs.
eluded within the terms "respond" or "response." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(25) (West Supp. 1990). Cleanup costs are
often referred to as "response" costs.
116. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9611(a) (West Supp. 1990). See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 9612(a) (West Supp. 1990) for
prerequisites to payment.
117. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9604(a)(1) and 9604(d) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990). In addition, many states have
other environmental legislation that affects the cleanup of toxic waste sites and specifies the persons who are liable
for cleanup costs. For a summary of the state provisions that existed in 1983 see Warren, State Hazardous Waste
Superfunds and CERCLA: Conflict or Complement?, 13 ENVTL L. 10, 348 (1983). New Jersey has one of the
most stringent sets of environmental laws. For a discussion of its provisions see Wagner, Liability for Hazardous
Waste Cleanup: An Examination of New Jersey's Approach, 13 HARv. ENVTL L. REV. 245 (1989). Some state
statutes predate the federal legislation. Some extend liability to the shareholder and officers of closely held corpo-
rations. See, e.g., the situation presented in Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
States share some of the cost of cleanup paid for by Superfund, usually 10%. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(c), but
they may bear more of the cost in some eases. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(c)(a) (West Supp. 1990).
Finally, the federal government may, in some eases, order a person to cleanup a site. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606
(West Supp. 1990).
118. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(A) and (B) (West Supp. 1990).
Liability is usually joint and several and if one party pays for the cleanup it can seek contribution from other
responsible parties. New York v. Shore Realty Co., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) and cases cited therein; United
States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 19 (D.R.I. 1989), affd, 910 F.2d 24 (Ist Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
III S. Ct. 957 (1991).
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act SARA, Pub. L. 99-499, enacted in 1986 provides
expressly for the right of contribution. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(0(1) (West Supp. 1990). That section also gives
courts broad power to allocate the costs among the parties "using such equitable factors as the court determines
are appropriate." Id. Regarding cases apportioning liability before SARA, see United States v. Northernaire
Plating Co.. 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
119. EPA. A MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM at ii, 7, 1-1I, 2-2, 2-14 (1989). The 1986
amendments gave the EPA broad authority to settle with responsible parties. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9622 (West Supp.
1990).
120. "The Cost Recovery Program serves a dual purpose for CERCLA enforcement. It is intended to both
recover revenues for the Fund and to encourage voluntary PRP [potentially responsible party] cleanup action by
eliminating any incentive for PRPs to allow the government to do the work." EPA. A MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF
THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM, 2-23 (1989). Costs are recovered from persons responsible under 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607
(West 1983 & Supp. 1990). See infra text accompanying notes 121-29.
Orders compelling a person responsible to perform the cleanup (See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606 (West Supp. 1990)),
will also encourage responsible persons to reach voluntary agreements with the EPA. EPA. A MANAGEMENT
REVIEW OF THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM, at 2-5 to 2-7 (1989).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
2. Liability Provisions of CERCLA
There are four categories of persons who can be held ultimately responsible
for cleanup and other response costs, 2 1 and understanding these four categories
is critical to any discussion of CERCLA liability. Liability is imposed on:
(1) the current owner or operator 12 of a facility;
(2) any person who owned or operated a facility at the time of the disposal;123
(3) any person who arranged for the disposal of a hazardous waste 12 4 (sometimes re-
ferred to as "arrangers" or "generators"); 12 5 or
(4) any person who transported the waste or accepted the waste for transport to the
facility (frequently referred to as "transporters").1 26
"Person" includes both an individual and a corporation. 27 A "facility" is any
site where a hazardous substance has been deposited or located, i.e., the con-
taminated site itself.'28
121. CERCLA imposes liability for "all costs of removal and remedial action incurred by the United States
or a state..." and "any other necessary costs of response by any other person. 42 U.S.C.A. §
9607(a)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1990). See also infra note 133.
122. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1) (West Supp. 1990) imposes liability on: "the owner and operator of a vessel
or facility," (emphasis added) but other sections use the phrase "owner or operator" (emphasis added). See, e.g., §
9601(20)(D) (defining the term "owner or operator") and § 9607(a)(2) (imposing liability on one who "owned or
operated"). Courts uniformly have required only that one be an owner or an operator of a facility. See, e.g.,
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 n.3 (1 th Cir. 1990); New York v. Shore Realty Co.,
759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985).
123. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2)(West Supp. 1990) imposes liability on "any person who at the time of dispo-
sal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which hazardous wastes were disposed of."
124. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(3)(West Supp. 1990), quoted infra note 285.
125. This category of liable persons is sometimes referred to as "generators" since those who arrange for
disposal or the transportation of toxic substances are often those who produced those substances, i.e., those who
"generated" it.
126. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4) (West Supp. 1990).
127. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(21) (West Supp. 1990) provides: "The term 'person' means an individual, firm,
corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States government,
State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body."
128. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(9) (West Supp. 1990). As in other portions of CERCLA, the provisions relating to
the term "facility" are less than clear and must be read together to make sense. The definitional provision says:
The term "facility" means (A) any building or structure installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (includ-
ing any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatments works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment,
ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed. or otherwise come to be located;
but does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
§ 9601(9) (emphasis added). If (A) is read as a separate definition from (B), any building or structure would be a
"facility"-even a building that had nothing whatsoever to do with a hazardous substance and under § 9607(a)(1)
liability would be imposed on persons who own or operate a building or other facility. Both (A) and (B) are
modified by the emphasized language, so that a facility is a place where a hazardous substance was "deposited,
stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located."
The next question becomes whether that could include a plant where the waste was generated but which itself
is not contaminated. For example, a factory may have created the waste as a by-product but properly disposed of
the waste. Is the factory a "facility?" The definitional section is unclear. It includes places where the substance
was "stored." However, the final clause suggests that "facility" means a place where the substance finally comes
to rest or has been contaminated with the waste. Thus, if the factory shows no signs of contamination, it is not a
"facility." This does not mean, however, that the factory (or its owner) will escape liability, for it may be consid-
ered an "arranger."
In addition, the liability provisions of § 9607(a)(2) and (3) are useful to interpret the term "facility." First, §
9607(a)(2) places liability on one who owned the facility at the time of the disposal at the facility. Second, §
9607(a)(3) imposes liability on those who arrange for disposal of the waste. This would cover those who generate
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A person within one of these four groups is often referred to as a "responsi-
ble party" or a "potentially responsible party."129 Liability is strict liability130
and CERCLA provides only three very limited defenses to this liability.'3 '
Under these CERCLA provisions creditors which foreclosed on contaminated
property or who participated in the management or operation of the site have
been held to be "owners or operators" and responsible for the full cost of
cleanup.232 Officers, directors and shareholders of the enterprise have been lia-
ble as "owners or operators," as arrangers, and as transporters.
waste and do not dispose of it on their premises but instead arrange for its disposal. Subsection (a)(3) would be
unnecessary if liability could be imposed upon the generator as an owner or operator of a facility under (a)(1).
129. Although not defined in CERCLA, these two terms are commonly used to refer to those persons who
can be held liable for the cleanup costs under § 9607(a). The EPA uses "potentially responsible party" as a term
of art and defines it in its publications. See, e.g., EPA MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM, app.
Ill, at 3.
130. New York v. Shore Realty Co., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Kayser-Roth
Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 19 (D.R.I. 1989), affid, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 957 (1991).
131. CERCLA provides three statutory defenses to liability: an act of God, an act of war, and an act or
omission of a third party who is unconnected with the defendant if the defendant "exercised due care" and "took
precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of the third party .... " 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b) (West 1983).
For a discussion of these and other possible defenses see Glass, Superfund and SARA: Are There Any Defenses
Left? 12 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 385 (1988).
132. The definition of "owner or operator" excludes a person "who, without participating in the management
of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility."
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990). Most courts have imposed liability on lenders who
foreclose and take title to the contaminated site on the theory that the creditor is the owner and no longer holds an
ownership interest merely to protect a security interest. See, e.g., Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-
Thomas, Inc.. 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556
(W.D. Pa. 1989); United States %,. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989); United States v. Maryland
Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986). But see United States v. Mirabel, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (exonerating one lender who was the high bidder at a sheriff's sale, did not
"operate" the site, and assigned its interest in the property after a few months).
The earlier cases, Mirabel and Maryland Bank, suggest that courts were "reluctant" to hold secured credi-
tors liable for the entire cleanup cost, see Heidt, Cleaning Up Your Act: Efficiency Considerations in the Battle
for the Debtor's Assets in Toxic Waste Bankruptcies, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 819, 828 n.43 (1988); cases decided
since then, however, show an opposite trend. For a discussion of the lender exception and lender liability in gen-
eral, see Tom, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Management Participation Under Section 101(20)(A) of CER-
CLA, 98 YALE LJ. 925 (1989); Comment, The Liability of Financial Institutions for Hazardous Waste Cleanup
Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 139 (1988); Comment, Lender Liability for Hazardous Waste: An
Economic and Legal Analysis, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 659 (1988); Comment, When a Security Becomes a Liability:
Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HAsTINOs Li. 1261 (1987) (all of these pieces were
written before the recent cases on the subject).
A recent case, United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990), affg, 724 F. Supp. 573
(D. Md. 1986), cert. denied, I I I S. Ct. 752 (1991), involved a creditor who held an interest in both the real estate
and personal property (inventory and equipment) of the responsible corporation. The creditor, being cautious, did
not foreclose on the real property. The government alleged that the creditor participated in the management of the
facility, was outside the exception for secured lenders and therefore liable. The court agreed that there was an
issue of fact as to whether the creditor was an "owner or operator" and refused to grant summary judgment for
the creditor. The court recognized that secured creditors often "have some involvement in the financial affairs of
their debtors" and said that involvement such as monitoring and helping with an occasional financial decision
would not expose the secured creditor to liability (i.e., the secured creditor will still be within the secured creditor
exception). However, if the secured creditor participates in the "financial management of a facility to a degree
indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes .... " then it is no longer
protected. The court said the secured creditors need not actually participate in the "day-to-day operations" of the
site. Id. at 1557-58. For a criticism of this view see infra note 330. Recently, the Court in In re Bergsoe Metal
Corp., 910 F. 2d. 668 (9th Cir. 1990) refused to impose liability on the secured creditor finding Fleet Factors too
broad. Rather it returned to the earlier tests that secured creditors lose their exception only when they participate
in the day-to-day operations of the facility. Id. at 672.
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This CERCLA liability is for 1) the full amount of the cleanup, 2) the full
amount of other "response" costs, and 3) damage to natural resources, subject
to certain limitations. 3 The liability of the shareholders is generally only at
issue, however, when the enterprise itself cannot pay the cost of cleanup and its
other obligations. Even though a shareholder is within a group that can be held
primarily and fully liable under CERCLA, as a matter of practice, that person
will be pursued when the corporation itself cannot meet the cost of cleanup.
Thus that person is, in the reality of practice, only "secondarily" liable.
B. Shareholder Liability as an Owner or Operator
1. Introduction
The first two categories of persons liable for the cleanup of a site are 1) the
current owners or operators of a facility and 2) the owners or operators of the
facility at the time of the disposal."" The "facility" is the contaminated site in
need of cleanup.' 35 These first two categories have been used most frequently in
imposing liability on shareholders. The only distinction between the two is the
time at which the person was an "owner" or "operator"-at the time of cleanup
or at the time of disposal.
The key question in these cases is whether a particular person is technically
an owner or operator. The statute is of little help: "owner or operator" is simply
defined as "any person owning or operating" the facility in question."36 An ex-
Another recent court refused to hold that a lender was an "operator," although several factors indicated an
involvement with the operations of the responsible corporation. The creditor's claim was for $8.5 million and the
court held that the creditor was justified in "keep[ing] informed about the financial status of the Debtor." In re
Corona Plastics, Inc., 99 Bankr. 231, 238 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989).
For some time creditors have had to walk a fine line between having sufficient control over their debtors in
order to protect their loans or collateral and becoming so involved so as to run the risk of becoming an "insider"
under the Bankruptcy Code-the consequence of which is to extend the preference period from 90 days to I year
(allowing the trustee to recover an increased amount of payments made by the debtor to the creditor during this
time). See II U.S.C.A. §§ 101(30)(B)(iii) (West Supp. 1990) and 547(b)(2) (West Supp. 1989). The line the
creditors must now walk is more dangerous. Should a creditor foreclose and become an "owner" or become so
involved with its debtor so as to lose its secured creditor exception, it can be held responsible for the full cost of
cleanup. Shareholders run similar risks.
Finally, lenders may bear a portion of the cleanup cost if the government is given priority to their collateral
for cleanup claims. This too has been discussed by several commentators, who vary in their conclusions regarding
the wisdom of a government superlien. See Schwenke & Lockett, Superlien "Solutions" to Hazardous Waste:
Bankruptcy Conflicts, ABA ENVTL. L. I (Winter 1983/84); and Heidt, Corrective Justice from Aristotle to Sec-
ond Order Liability: Who Should Pay When the Culpable Cannot? 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347 (1990).
133. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990). The liability for resource damages by facili-
ties (with the exception of certain motor vehicles, aircraft and pipelines) is "capped" at $50 million. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 9607(c)(I)(D) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
Damages can climb even higher should the responsible party refuse to "properly provide removal or remedial
action upon order of the President . . ." in which case punitive damages can be assessed up to three times the
total costs paid by Superfund as a result of the failure of the responsible party to act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(c)(3)
(West 1983). For additional damage provisions see 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(c)(2) (West 1983).
134. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1) and (2) (West Supp. 1990). See supra notes 122-23.
135. See supra note 128. The terms facility and contaminated site are used interchangeably.
136. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) provides: "'owner or operator' means . . . (ii) in the case of an onshore
facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such facility."
The lack of clarity in the CERCLA provisions has been commented on by courts and writers alike. See, e.g.,
In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. 22, 25 n.2 (D. Mass. 1987). As a comment on the poor drafting of CERCLA,
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ception is provided for anyone who holds indicia of ownership to protect a secur-
ity interest but who does not participate in the management of the facility.
137
The language of the statute placing liability on the "owner or operator" of
a facility has caused two problems often exacerbated by the courts. First, most
courts have treated the phrase "owner or operator" as a single unit, failing to
distinguish between the two terms. 138 The distinction is important. "Owners"
are liable by virtue of their ownership alone-an owner need not have partici-
pated in the disposal to be liable. Thus, landlords are liable as owners although
the tenants contaminated the property and a secured creditor which forecloses
and becomes the "owner" of the contaminated property is liable.139 "Operator"
on the other hand connotes some involvement with the disposal or management
of the facility. From a corporate law viewpoint, if the facility is owned by the
corporation, a shareholder is not technically an "owner" unless the corporate
veil is pierced. A shareholder who actually operates the facility, however, argua-
bly is an "operator." Because the courts have generally treated the term as a
unit, this Article will refer to "owner or operator" in order to discuss the cases
fully, but the reader should bear in mind that use of the term "operator" alone
is often more appropriate when discussing the liability of shareholders under
CERCLA. Second, courts have failed to focus on the term "facility." They are
often unclear on whether one must be the "owner or operator" of the corpora-
tion or of the facility. While one who operates the corporation may also be the
operator of the facility, courts have not taken the time to make the necessary
connections and tie their reasoning back to the statutory language.
Courts of appeals of three circuits and over a dozen district courts have
considered the question of whether a shareholder can be an "owner or operator"
and responsible for the cleanup of a toxic waste site. Courts have devised a
number of tests to determine whether a shareholder is liable as an "owner or
operator." From these various tests one can compile a list of the factors courts
have considered relevant in making the determination. The courts have looked
at the degree of the shareholder's:
1. actual participation in the management of the corporation;
2. actual participation in the management of the facility;
3. actual participation in the waste disposal;
4. power to control the management or operations of the corporation;
5. power to control the management or operations of the facility;
6. power to control the waste disposal itself;
7. ability to prevent or abate the disposal or its effect;
8. awareness of the disposal practices;
9. receipt of benefits from the wrongful disposal;
one court asked what a facility might be that is neither onshore nor offshore and suggested it might be one in
outer space! Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
137. See supra note 132.
138. An exception is both the court of appeals and district court in United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910
F.2d 24 (Ist Cir. 1990), affg in part, 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989). Both courts were careful to distinguish
between shareholder liability as an "owner," which could be imposed only indirectly if the veil were pierced, and
as an "operator," which could be imposed directly under CERCLA. See infra text accompanying notes 185-86. A
few other courts have made the distinction as well, including Riverside Mkt. Dev. Corp. v. International Bldg.
Prod., Slip No. 88-5317, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6375 (E.D. La. May 23, 1990).
139. See supra note 132.
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10. extent of ownership interest in the responsible corporation.
Although courts have not used these factors in any uniform manner, one
can begin to see certain trends in the case law. The list is intended here to help
guide the reader through the discussion that follows. This section will begin by
discussing and analyzing the three circuit court cases and then go on to fill in
some of the gaps by discussing several district court cases.
The first court of appeals case to consider the question of shareholder lia-
bility as an owner or operator was New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,140 decided
in 1985 and the most recent was United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp.,"14 de-
cided in August 1990. Joslyn v. T.L. James & Company142 was decided in Jan-
uary 1990 and represents a significant departure from Shore Realty, Kayser-
Roth and most of the district court cases.141
2. Circuit Court Cases
In 1985 the Second Circuit decided New York v. Shore Realty Corp.144 An
individual, Donald LeoGrande, formed Shore Realty Corporation in order to
purchase and develop a parcel of land. Shore Realty Corp. purchased the prop-
erty knowing that hazardous waste was stored in large, leaking tanks. The haz-
ardous waste had contaminated the site and was seeping and leaking into the
groundwater and surrounding harbor. 145 LeoGrande knew of the contamination
and presence of the waste and knew the potential cleanup cost." 6 The State of
New York incurred costs under CERCLA in evaluating the site and supervising
some removal actions.147
After holding Shore Realty Corp. liable as an owner of the site, the court
turned to the question of LeoGrande's personal liability. LeoGrande was the
"officer and stockholder" of Shore Realty Corp. 14  The court held LeoGrande
liable for two reasons. First, the court looked to the secured lender exception:
that one is not an "owner or operator" if one "without participating in the man-
agement of a .. .facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his
140. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
141. 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 957 (1991).
142. 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), affg, 696 F. Supp. 222 (W.D. La. 1988), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 1017
(1991).
143. In addition, the Eighth Circuit decided United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical
Co., ("NEPACCO"), 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987), but it did not have to
decide the difficult question of shareholder liability as an owner or operator since the responsible corporation itself
neither owned nor operated the facility. See infra text accompanying note 212.
144. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
145. Id. at 1038-39. Prior to the sale to Shore Realty Corp. the property was owned by a hazardous waste
disposal company, which illegally operated a storage facility for toxic wastes at the site. When Shore purchased
the property, not only were portions of the land and water contaminated, but there were five 700,000 gallon tanks
and six smaller tanks on the property, each of which contained hazardous substances-benzene, dichlorobenzene,
ethyl benzene, and PCBs, just to name a few. Id. at 1038.
146. Before taking title, Shore Realty Corp. (and LcoGrande) received a full environmental report from its
own consulting firm. Id. Shore Realty Corp. sought a "waiver ... of liability" from the appropriate state agency
but was refused. Shore Realty Corp. purchased the property nonetheless. Id. at 1039.
147. Id. at 1042-43.
148. Id. at 1037.
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security interest in the facility. 14 9 The court said that this "implies that an
owning stockholder who manages the corporation, such as LeoGrande, is liable
under CERCLA as an 'owner or operator."' 1 50 The court's analysis is based on
an exception to the definition of "owner or operator" which applies to one who
holds "indicia of ownership" to protect a security interest. Although "security
interest" is not defined in CERCLA, owning shares in a corporation is not nor-
mally considered a "security interest." For example, the Uniform Commercial
Code defines security interest as "an interest in personal property or fixtures
which secures payment or performance of an obligation."' 5' For the purposes of
the Bankruptcy Code, a "security interest" is a "lien created by an agree-
ment,"1 52 and a "lien" is a "charge against or interest in property to secure
payment of a debt or performance of an obligation."' 53 A share of stock repre-
sents ownership in the corporation; it is not an interest which secures payment
or the performance of an obligation. While the secured lender exception argua-
bly shows a Congressional intent to hold a shareholder who manages the facility
liable, 1 54 it is not clear that is the point the court was making in Shore Realty.
Further, the court in this part referred to LeoGrande's management of the cor-
poration, while the exception for secured lenders refers to participation in the
management of the facility. 55
The second ground is more convincing. The court said that since Leo-
Grande was "in charge of the operation of the facility," he was liable as an
"operator" within the meaning of section 9607(a)(1). 56 The key factor here is
control over the facility, although it is unclear whether the court meant that he
exercised control, i.e., he actually participated in the operations or management
of the facility, or that he had the power to control the management of the facil-
ity. Here the court follows the statute more faithfully since 1) the court focuses
on liability as an operator and 2) it focuses on the facility, not the
corporation. 5 7
In early 1990 the Fifth Circuit refused to impose liability on shareholders
as owners or operators. In Joslyn Mfg. Corp. v. T.L. James & Co.,' the court
considered the shareholder liability question in terms of a parent/subsidiary re-
lationship. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of a parent corporation, which absolved it from liability for the environ-
mental wrongdoing of its subsidiary. 59
149. Id. at 1052 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. 9601(20)(A)).
150. Id. The key factors here were ownership of the corporation and management of the corporation. Al-
though the court initially said in summary that it was holding the shareholder liable as an "operator," itdid not
distinguish between the two terms in the rest of its discussion in this segment of the opinion.
151. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1978).
152. II U.S.C. § 101(45) (1988).
153. II U.S.C. § 101(33) (1988).
154. See infra text accompanying notes 329-32.
155. In spite or these departures from the statutory p ovisions, ther courts have also based their tests on the
so-called "security interest exception." See, e.g., United States v. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1203 (E.D. Pa.
1989). discussed infra text accompanying notes 232-42.
156. 759 F.2d at 1052.
157. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(I), set forth supra in note 122.
158. 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990). aff'g, 696 F. Supp. 222 (W.D. La. 1988).
159. The court also declined to pierce the corporate veil. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
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The subsidiary was formed in 1935.16° The parent corporation, T. L. James
& Co., owned a majority and had control over all of the shares of the subsidi-
ary.'' The factors regarding the relationship between the parent and subsidiary
are more particularly set out in the lower court opinion, and they indicate that
the subsidiary was in some ways or at some times under the control of the
parent but also that the subsidiary had control over a large part of its manage-
ment or operations. 62 For example, the two corporations had several common
board members and persons connected with the parent sometimes had control
over the subsidiary's board.'63 Officers were sometimes common to both. The
subsidiary observed corporate formalities. 64 In 1950 the subsidiary was sold
and it later passed through a number of owners.'6 5 These various owners in-
curred liability under CERCLA and sought to impose liability on the parent
under Section 9607(a)(2) as one who was an owner or operator at the time of
the disposal.
The court refused to impose liability on the parent directly under CER-
CLA. 66 CERCLA, it said, does not include a parent company in the definition
of "owner or operator," and to include the parent would "dramatically alter
traditional concepts of corporation law."'1 7 The court stated that it would re-
spect the corporate rule of limited liability for shareholders absent a direction
from Congress that CERCLA liability should extend to parent corporations for
the acts of their subsidiaries. 6 ' The court did not distinguish between the terms
"owner" and "operator."
The court, however, misperceived the concept of limited liability. The court
said that when a legislature wants to "change the interpretation of a judicially
created concept, it makes that intent specific."' 69 Later the court said
"[w]ithout an express Congressional directive to the contrary, common-law
principles of corporation law, such as limited liability, govern our court's
analysis." 1 0
160. 893 F.2d at 81.
161. Id. The two "minority" shareholders owned 40% of the shares but had endorsed those shares to the
parent to secure their "unpaid capital subscription." Id. at 81.
162. 696 F. Supp. 222, 227-30.
163. Initially five out of seven members of the board of directors of the subsidiary "were in association with"
the parent and the other two were the two minority shareholders. Id. In 1945, however, only two out of five
directors had ties to the parent and in 1947 four out of eight had ties to the parent. Id. The board members,
however, were employers of the subsidiary and it is possible that the parent had some control over the subsidiary's
employees or their placement on the board. T.L. James, the individual, was the president of the subsidiary and
was later succeeded by his son. 893 F.2d 80, 81.
164. The subsidiary held shareholders and directors meetings and it "owned its own property and equipment,
and maintained its own employees, payrolls, insurance, pension system, and workman's compensation program.
Lincoln filed its own tax returns." Id. at 82.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 82-83.
167. Id. at 82.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 83 (emphasis added).
170. Id. (emphasis added).
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Limited liability is not a common law principle today. It is a concept estab-
lished by statute (usually state statute).' 1 ' Joslyn presents additional complica-
tions since Louisiana law has a civil law background. However, the court made
no reference to that system and spoke in general terms about the origins of
limited liability assuming those origins to be part of the common law. Thus, this
discussion refers to the development of the concept of limited liability generally
in the United States since that is the apparent basis of the court's opinion. The
unique points of Louisiana law are set out in the margin. 17 2
To analyze fully the court's view of limited liability requires considering
whether limited liability was ever a common law principle and whether the cor-
porate statutes of today are consistent with or in derogation of the common law.
First, in the United States the corporate form has always been a creature of the
legislature and not a part of the common law.17 3 Second, the early corporations
were created by a special act of the legislature, since there were no general
incorporation laws at the time. These special grants often specified whether the
corporate shareholders enjoyed limited liability or not. 74 According to one ex-
pert on the subject, no court in New England, where much of the American
business corporate law was developed, had to decide whether a shareholder was
liable to the corporation's creditors or whether a shareholder enjoyed limited
liability when the charter was silent on this point although a few courts did
have to decide whether the corporation could "assess" shareholders for amounts
the corporation paid to a creditor. 7 5 When a few courts did not allow share-
holders to be assessed, legislatures responded quickly. Initially legislatures en-
acted laws requiring all corporate charters to provide for unlimited liability. 7 6
171. A few corporations are created by federal statute, such as the Legal Aid Corporation. However, the
corporations involved in all of the CERCLA suits were created under state statutes.
172. Louisiana's rule of limited liability was created by statute, just as it was in the other states. Interest-
ingly, the statute was repealed and never replaced but limited liability lived on as part of the state's "customary
law" at the relevant times of this case. Louisiana's Constitution and the comments provide that statutes and their
interpretations are superior to customary law. Thus, the State of Louisiana argued that its environmental statute
patterned after CERCLA must be read to take precedence over the non-statutory customary law of Louisiana of
limited liability. See Reply Brief of Amicus Curiae, the State of Louisiana, at 4-7 (by Assistant Attorney General
William Ridlon). Not only did the Court in Joslyn fail to properly identify the origins of limited liability but it
simply concluded that the results would be the same under the Louisiana environmental statute as under CER-
CLA without exploring the fine points of the Louisiana system. 893 F.2d at 83. Further, under a doctrine of
interpreting statutes in Louisiana, in construing Louisiana law based on a federal law, courts may look to decisions
under the federal law. The State of Louisiana argued that the case law supported a result in favor of liability.
Brief of anicus curiae, the State of Louisiana at 20-21 and n.19 (by Assistant Attorney General William Ridlon).
173. The United States adopted the view from England that "some positive act of the sovereign was neces-
sary to create corporate statue." J. HURST, supra note 9, at 8-9; I. WORMSER, supra note I I at 15, 17. The origin
of the corporation is not known with any certainty. See id. J. HURST, supra note 9, at 6-7. What is clear is that by
the time of the Revolution an act of the legislature was needed to create a corporation. See J. HURST, supra note
9; I. WORMSER, supra note II.
174. See E DODD, supra note 10, at 373-76. After 1809 an unlimited liability provision was included in each
manufacturing corporation's charter. Id. at 375-77.
175. E. DODD, supra note 10, at 369-73. Dodd, supra note 10, at 1356-57.
The common law that may have been in effect in England at the time of the Revolution is of little help. To
the extent the courts in England considered the subject, they did so in the context of public utility or nonprofit
corporations and those decisions are of limited value to the business corporation as it then developed in the United
States. E. DODD, supra note 10. at 13-14. See also id. at 84-93, 365-73, 387-89; J. HURST, supra note 9, at 27-28.
See also 1. WORMSER, supra note II, at 27.
176. E. DODD, supra note 10, at 375-77; Dodd supra note 10, at 1361-66.
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Later, legislatures were permitted to include limited liability in the special char-
ters they granted.277 Finally in the mid-1800s, more than fifty years after corpo-
rations first began to appear in this country, limited liability became a standard
part of corporate law through general incorporation laws enacted by the state
legislatures.1 78 The American business corporation as we know it with its lim-
ited liability feature, is virtually wholly statutory. Thus, what we have is not a
question of Congress altering the common law. If Congress "changed" anything
it changed modern statutory law which developed almost exclusively from for-
mer statutory law.
The court in Joslyn incorrectly relied on the proposition that if Congress
had wanted to change a common law rule it should have made its intention
clear. Absent that clear intention, the "common law" rule of limited liability
should prevail. Since statutory law, not common law, is concerned, the question
is how to treat the relationship between state statutory law and CERCLA. This
relationship is discussed in part IV."79
Finally, the court in Joslyn also relied on language used in a 1986 amend-
ment to the term "owner or operator." An "owner or operator" is defined sim-
ply as "any person owning or operating such facility.'280 The new clause pro-
vides: "(iii) in the case of any facility, title or control of which was conveyed
due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means
to a unit of State, or local government, any person who owned, operated or
otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand."1 81 The
court focused on the use of the word "controlled," which did not appear in the
preceding definitional clause of owner or operator. Thus, the court said that
since a "'control' test" appeared in subsection (iii) and not in (ii) Congress
must have meant not to include a "'control' test" within the general definition
of "owner or operator" in clause (ii). 82 Apparently the court believed that had
such a control test been included in the earlier clause, the statute could be read
to impose direct liability on a parent corporation.
There are several problems with this argument. First, the two relevant sub-
sections of this definition were written at different times. Subsection (ii) was
enacted in 1980 and subsection (iii) was added in the Senate by floor amend-
ment to SARA in 1986. Further, on the Senate floor Senator Stafford explained
that under the original definition a government which acquired property
through foreclosure or abandonment would be an "owner or operator." The
177. E. DODD, supra note 10, at 377-84; Dodd supra note 10, at 1366-71.
178. E. DODD, supra note 10, at 384-87 (regarding Mass.). See also, id. at 391-436 regarding the decision in
other northeastern states. There were some exceptions to this trend. According to Dodd, Connecticut and New
Hampshire included limited liability in most charters granted after 1816. Id. at 387. These states did not have
general incorporation laws until the late 1830s. Id. at 387 n.2 (regarding New Hampshire) and 416 (regarding
Connecticut).
179. See infra text accompanying notes 337-67.
180. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1990).
181. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (West Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
182. 893 F.2d at 83.
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1986 amendment was intended to eliminate liability in such cases183 and to
place liability on the person who owned, operated or otherwise controlled the
property before it was transferred to the government. As the United States ar-
gued in Joslyn, the use of the phrase "any person who owned, operated or oth-
erwise controlled" the property can be read to mean that Congress read the
then current owner or operator definition of subsections (i) and (ii) to include
persons with such control.'
Further, the court's logic is inconsistent. If one assumes that a control test
only applies in subsection (iii) (regarding those who controlled the property
before the involuntary transfer) then that means that one who controlled the
property in other cases cannot be an owner or operator under the general defini-
tions. The statute would make no sense if the addition of the term "controlled"
in subsection (iii) were read to mean that one who has control cannot be an
owner or operator under (i) or (ii) because those sections do not include a con-
trol test.
Recently, in United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp.,8 5 the First Circuit held
that a parent corporation could be liable as an "operator" directly under CER-
CLA. The court was careful to distinguish between liability as an "owner" and
as an "operator." The court considered whether CERCLA imposed direct lia-
bility on shareholders as "operators," but unfortunately it did not provide the
detailed statutory analysis needed at this time. The court noted that CERCLA
imposed liability on shareholders as "owners" only indirectly if the corporate
veil were pierced.' 86
Regarding direct liability as an operator, the court said that the liability
provisions of CERCLA place liability on operators as well as owners. From this
the court inferred "that a person who is an operator of a facility is not protected
from liability by the legal structure of ownership."' 87 That is, the corporate
form of ownership does not protect one from operator liability. Second, the
court said that there was no indication that Congress intended to exclude parent
corporations from liability as operators.8 8 Next, the court said that other courts
had also concluded that a shareholder could be an "operator."'89 However, of
the two cases relied on, one case did not involve the liability of a shareholder as
an operator. Rather, it involved the liability of the shareholder as an "arranger"
183. 131 CONG. REC. S11619 (Sept. 17, 1985). As further explained by Senator Bentsen: "this covers the
situation. . . where local governments inherit property . . . through foreclosure or whatever ... , and they
would not be determined owner or operators under the provision of this law."
184. Reply Brief for the United States as Anicus Curiae, pages 12-14.
185. 910 F.2d 24 (Ist Cir. 1990), afg in part, 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989).
186. Id. at 25. See also id. at 26.
187. Id. at 26.
188. Id.
189. It cited Idaho v. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986). see infra text accompanying notes
223-30, and Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 743-33 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 848 (1987) (Here the court was mistaken since the Court of Appeals in NEPACCO held the shareholder
liable as an arranger, not an operator.). See infra text accompanying notes 283-90. The court also referred to
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990), regarding the liability of a secured creditor
who became involved in the activities of the responsible corporation.
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under section 9607(a)(3). 19 ° Finally, the court distinguished Joslyn by saying
Joslyn was more concerned with "owner" liability than "operator" liability."'
However, this argument is not persuasive since it relies on a distinction that
most courts have simply failed to observe-the difference between owner and
operator. Joslyn expressly considered the question of whether CERCLA im-
posed liability on shareholders independent of a veil piercing theory. 92 It failed
to distinguish between the terms "owner" and "operator" but by considering
direct CERCLA liability it implicitly considered the liability of the share-
holder/parent as an operator since owner liability applies only if the veil is
pierced.
These four brief points led the court in Kayser-Roth to hold that liability
could be imposed directly on a shareholder under CERCLA.
In deciding whether to actually impose this direct liability given the facts,
the court in Kayser-Roth refused to set out an "exact standard" by which it
would judge whether the parent was an operator. It said, however, that owner-
ship alone with its attendant ability to control, was not sufficient to render a
shareholder an "operator."'' a "At a minimum it requires active involvement in
the activities of the subsidiary."' 94 The court recited the facts as found by the
district court which showed that the parent exercised "practical total influence
and control" or "pervasive control" over the subsidiary. 9 5 The specific facts
supporting this control were: the parent had total financial control over the sub-
sidiary (including control over the budget, collecting accounts receivable, ap-
proval of expenditures over 5,000 dollars, and approval of sale or lease of real
estate); government contracts were "funneled" through the parent; the parent
installed its personnel in most of the subsidiary's officer and director positions;
and the parent had the ability to control the environmental wrongdoing of the
subsidiary and prevent the damage. 9
The three appellate cases, Shore Realty Corp., Joslyn, and Kayser-Roth
show the two ends of the spectrum of liability of shareholders under CERCLA.
These courts of appeals decided the question of shareholder liability in the con-
text of the paradigm situation: a corporation was both the owner and operator
of a facility in need of cleanup. For all practical purposes the shareholder in
each case was the sole shareholder of the corporation.9 7 In each case there
existed some control by the shareholder over the corporation but the extent of
such control varied among the cases. The cases reached different conclusions
and none provides us with a full well-reasoned opinion.
190. "Our decision is supported by the interpretation given 'operator' by other courts. See, e.g., United States
v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987)
(individual liability under § 9607(a)(3))." 910 F.2d at 26 (emphasis added). Subsection (a)(3) is "arranger"
liability, not operator liability.
191. Id. at 27.
192. 893 F.2d at 82-83.
193. 910 F.2d at 27.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 27 (quoting the district court opinion reported at 724 F. Supp. at 18. 22).
196. Id. at 27 (quoting the district court opinion at 22).
197. Technically in Joslyn, the shareholder controlled the 40% of shares it did not own via a pledge
agreement.
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Shore Realty was based in part on peculiar reading and application of the
secured creditor exception, and is not very persuasive.1 98 The other reason given
in Shore Realty was simply that the shareholder was "in charge of" the facility.
While sufficient control by a shareholder over the facility may be enough to
impose liability as an operator, it would have been helpful if Shore Realty pro-
vided a more detailed analysis of its interpretation of the statute and the facts it
relied on.
Joslyn, on the other hand, asserts that if a corporation is liable for an act,
limited liability protects shareholders from liability for those same acts.
Kayser-Roth provides little in the way of statutory interpretation support-
ing direct shareholder liability. It does not examine the question in any depth. It
does make two important contributions, however. First, the court respects the
distinction between the two terms "owner" and "operator" and says that share-
holders may be operators although not technically owners. Second, although
Kayser-Roth did not develop a test for operator liability, it did refer to the
district court's reliance on "total practical control" or "pervasive control,"'
thus providing some guidance with respect to the standard to be applied. The
holding in Joslyn not only conflicts with that of Shore Realty and Kayser-Roth,
but also with the district court cases that considered the question (except the
lower court in Joslyn itself), including Carolawn, Staco, Bunker Hill, Conser-
vation Chemical, Nicolet, the Kelly cases, McGraw Edison Quadion Corp., and
Riverside Market all of which are discussed in the next section.
Taken together, these cases raise questions both of statutory interpretation
(specifically the meaning of the term "operator") and of the relationship be-
tween state law and CERCLA. These two subjects are discussed in detail in
part IV.
3. District Court Cases
a. General Developments
One of the first courts to consider the question of direct shareholder liabil-
ity under CERCLA was the district court in United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co., Inc., ["NEPACCO"].200 The district court
opinion in this case has been followed, cited, and quoted by many later courts
even though the court of appeals reversed the relevant portion of the opinion on
factual grounds.20' The court of appeals never addressed the test used by the
lower court in imposing liability and that test has remained a touchstone for
future cases.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 144-55.
199. If the phrase "pervasive control" sounds suddenly familiar, it is because it was used by several courts
(including the district court in Kayser-Roth) in deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil in the CERCLA
context. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64. As this article was going to print, the District Court of New
Jersey decided Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1248 (D.N.J. 1991). The case relied on Kaiser-
Roth and denied summary judgment to a parent corporation and remanded the case for further proceedings.
200. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo., 1984), affd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726, 749 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
201. See infra text accompanying note 212.
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In the early 1970s, the corporation, NEPACCO, manufactured a disinfec-
tant, the by-products of which were extremely hazardous. 20 2 Lee, the plant
manager and also a shareholder, made arrangements to dispose of the waste at
a nearby farm owned by a third party.2°a In 1971 the waste was buried at the
farm.
In 1974 NEPACCO liquidated its assets, paid its creditors and distributed
the remainder to the shareholders.20 4 The EPA, after receiving a tip in 1979,
began to investigate the site and took steps to contain the waste and limit the
resulting damage. The EPA sued NEPACCO, Lee, and several others20 1 under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). 20 1 When Congress en-
acted CERCLA in 1980 the EPA amended its complaint to include claims
based on the new statute. 20 7
The district court held that the corporate entity, NEPACCO, made the
disposal arrangements and that it was liable under both sections 9607(a)(1) and
(a)(3), i.e., as an "owner or operator" of the facility and as one who arranged
for the disposal. 20 8 Lee was also held to be an owner or operator.
The portion of the opinion most often referred to by other courts is the test
that the court applied to Lee. The district court said one "who owns an interest
in a facility and is actively participating in its management can be held liable
for the disposal of hazardous waste. '208 Lee was a vice president, in charge of
the plant at which the hazardous substances were generated, was a "major"
shareholder, actively participated in the management of NEPACCO, had the
ability to control the waste disposal, the "power to direct the negotiations" re-
garding the disposal at the farm, and had the "capacity to prevent and abate
the damage ... ."2,' Therefore, the lower court imposed liability on Lee as
"both an owner and operator of the NEPACCO plant. 211
202. 810 F.2d at 729-30.
203. 810 F.2d at 730. Lee also approved the services of the disposers. Id.
204. Id. at 729.
205. The EPA included Michaels, the president and majority shareholder, and Mills, the plant superinten-
dent and one of the persons who actually disposed of the waste, in the suit. Although held liable by the district
court as a person who accepted hazardous waste for disposal, § (9607)(a)(4), Mills did not appeal.
206. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901 to 6992 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
207. Since CERCLA was enacted after the acts which gave rise to the claim took place, the court addressed
the question of whether CERCLA application was retroactive. The circuit court concluded that Congress intended
CERCLA to be applied retroactively. 810 F.2d at 732-33. This retroactive application withstood a due process
challenge from the defendants since the cleanup of sites "is a legitimate legislative purpose, and Congress acted in
a rational manner in imposing liability for the cost of cleaning up such sites upon those parties who created and
profited from the sites and upon the chemical industry as a whole." Id. at 734.
The court also held that the government could recover the costs spent prior to the enactment of CERCLA.
Id. at 734-37. (Relying on United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985)).
208. 579 F. Supp. at 847. The court's discussion of NEPACCO's corporate liability is short. It does not even
refer to NEPACCO as an owner or operator, it simply refers to §§ 9607(a)(l) and (a)(3).
209. Id. at 849.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 848. During this time Edwin Michacls was the president of the corporation and the largest share-
holder. There is no indication that Michaels knew about or was involved with the disposal, but he had substantial
control over the operations of NEPACCO as its major shareholder and president. Id. at 845. Although Michaels
had no actual knowledge of the disposal activities, he knew the dangers of the hazardous waste the company %%as
producing, he founded the operation at the plant in question, he was a "major" stockholder and as president he
had the "capacity and general responsibility" to control the disposal, the "power to direct the negotiations con-
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The circuit court reversed the liability imposed as an owner or operator
since the "facility" was the farm and it was owned and operated by an unre-
lated third party,2"2 but the appellate court did not comment on the appropri-
ateness of the test used by the district court.21 3 Later courts have relied on the
tests used by the district court both before and after the court of appeals
decision.
The next case to consider the subject was United States v. Carolawn Com-
pany.214 The court refused to grant judgment on the pleadings to three persons
who were shareholders and officers of the responsible corporation.21 5 The court
quoted NEPACCO2 16 and held that a person who had control over a facility or
who "participates in the management" of the facility releasing the toxic waste
could be liable as an owner or operator. 21 7 The corporate character of the enter-
prise was no defense to the individual defendants. The court did not distinguish
between the terms "owner" and "operator. 11 8 The court did, however, focus on
the management of the facility (as required by the language of the statute)
rather than the more general management of the corporation.
In United States v. Conservation Chemical Company219 the district court
considered the liability of a majority shareholder who was also the president,
had initially been the sole technical person at the facility, and later made all
cerning the disposal" at the farm and "the capacity to prevent and abate the damage caused by the disposal
. ... Id. at 849. Thus, Michaels also was held liable as an "owner and operator" of the NEPACCO plant. Id.
212. 810 F.2d at 742-43 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). The court of appeals did impose
liability on one of the shareholders as an arranger. See infra text accompanying notes 284-91.
213. The court of appeals did impose liability on both Lee and also the majority shareholder, Michaels, who
was less involved, under RCRA as persons who "contributed" to the disposal of toxic waste that created an
"imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." Although the shareholder/president
(Michaels) was not involved in the planning or arranging he was in control of the corporation and was "in charge
of and directly responsible for all of" the corporate operations and "had the ultimate authority to control the
disposal of NEPACCO's hazardous substances." Thus, the very fact of control, even if not exercised, placed this
majority shareholder/president in a position of liability. This position of control has become a factor in determin-
ing liability in later cases, both under CERCLA and RCRA. Although the circuit court had to absolve Lee and
Michaels from liability as owners or operators since the farm was owned by an unrelated party, the court was very
focused on the factor of "control," in the context of RCRA liability. Had the waste been deposited on NEPACCO
property, Michaels, as a person in control of the site or the corporation, and Lee, as the person in control of the
disposal and possibly of the site, may well have been considered "operators."
The other issue in NEPACCO is of some significance. In NEPACCO the corporation had dissolved and had
distributed all of its assets to creditors and shareholders five years prior to any action regarding the cleanup of a
site contaminated with toxic waste by the enterprise. The statute of limitations for any claims against the corpora-
tion would normally have long since run had the corporation properly dissolved. In the NEPACCO case, however,
the corporation had never actually dissolved and suit could still be brought against it. See Note, Corporate Life
After Death: CERCLA Preemption of State Corporate Dissolution Law, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 131 (1989) for a
discussion of the liability of corporations post dissolution for CERCLA claims and specifically whether CERCLA
preempts state corporate law to allow liability.
The fact that NEPACCO itself could still be sued is of little practical consequence if it has no assets and
reviving" the corporation does not lead to the imposition of liability on others, such as the shareholders. Gener-
ally, shareholder liability following a proper corporate dissolution is very limited.
214. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,699 (D.S.C., June 15, 1984).
215. In this case the three owners of the corporation had also actually had title to the contaminated property
for a brief period. The court, however, was clear that liability might be imposed not only due to that period of
ownership, but also due to the roles and acts of the three in the corporation.
216. It quoted the phrase set forth at text accompanying note 209.
217. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,700.
218. Id.
219. 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985)
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decisions about the projects the company would be involved in. He "was primar-
ily responsible for environmental controls" at the site and was involved in the
day-to-day operations of the facility.220 The court held that he might be liable
as a current owner (under section 9607(a)(1)) or as one who owned or operated
a facility at the time of disposal (under section 9607(a)(2)). 211 The court re-
fused to grant summary judgment against the individual, however. The court
reviewed the earlier decisions of Shore Realty and Carolawn and relied on the
district court's test in NEPACCO. 22 In Conservation Chemical, the liability
suggested as a current owner is inappropriate since the corporation owned the
site. The individual was actively involved in the management of the site at the
time of the disposal, 223 and liability is therefore appropriate as an operator
under section 9607(a)(2). The court also correctly focused on the individual's
activities at the facility rather than the corporation.
In Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co.,224 the facts showed a close relationship be-
tween parent and subsidiary. The parent's consent was required before expendi-
tures of 500 dollars or more could be made by the subsidiary for pollution mat-
ters, the parent controlled a majority of the board of directors at various times,
and the subsidiary was wholly owned by the parent. 225 The court reviewed the
statutory language of "owner or operator" liability and at first summarily con-
cluded that due to the level of the parent's participation in the management of
the subsidiary, the parent was an "owner or operator. '226 Next, the court relied
on the district court's test in NEPACCO.2 7 The court in Bunker Hill went on
to say that the parent could be liable for the acts of its subsidiary since the
parent: (1) was both in a "position to be, and was, intimately familiar with
hazardous waste disposal and releases" at the subsidiary; (2) had the authority
to control the disposal, and (3) had the power to make decisions to "prevent and
abate the damage caused by the disposal. '228 The court also looked at the Con-
gressional intent to impose the burdens of toxic waste disposal on those who had
reaped the gains for the disposal.22 9 Here, the parent had substantial gains in
the form of dividends from the act of the subsidiary in disposing of the toxic
waste. The parent received some 27,000,000 dollars in dividends from the sub-
sidiary while the authorized capital of the subsidiary was only 1100 dollars.230
The court concluded that these factors were sufficient to make the parent an
"owner or operator" of the subsidiary.231 The court did not distinguish between
the two terms "owner" and "operator."
220. Id. at 187.
221. Id at 190.
222. See supra text accompanying note 208.
223. 619 F. Supp. at 190.
224. 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 671.
227. See supra text accompanying note 209.
228. 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986).
229. Id. at 671-72 (citing the district court opinion in NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 848-49). See also, infra
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In United States v. Nicolet,2a2 the government asserted three theories upon
which the sole shareholder/parent could be held liable directly as a former
owner or operator of the contaminated site under section 9607(a)(2). Two of
those theories are relevant here.
First, the parent was the sole shareholder of the subsidiary and had "ac-
tively participated in the management while" the improper disposal was occur-
ring. 233 The court agreed with the government that this was sufficient to state a
cause of action against the parent or shareholder as an owner or operator. Un-
fortunately, the court's reasoning and also its holding are less than clear. The
court did not specify whether participation in the management of the corpora-
tion or the contaminated site was important, but implied that management of
the corporation was the important factor.234 The court also followed a case con-
cerning lender liability,235 which explained the security interest exception and,
like Shore Realty, implied from this exception for secured lenders that share-
holders who participate in management can be liable.2 38 The court also failed to
distinguish between the two terms "owner" and "operator." However, as de-
cided, the case, like several others,23 1 makes the combination of corporate own-
ership and active participation in management of the responsible corporation a
deadly combination when it comes to shareholder liability.
Second, the parent was familiar with the disposal practices of the subsidi-
ary, it could control the disposal and the releases, it could have abated the effect
of the disposal, and it benefited from the "disposal practice. ' 23 The court again
agreed with the government that this created a cause of action against the par-
ent as a former owner or operator under section 9607(a)(2).2 39 The court relied
on Bunker Hill, saying that there the court imposed liability on a7 parent corpo-
ration under similar circumstances when the parent participated in the manage-
ment of the subsidiary.240 The Nicolet court focused on the portion of Bunker
Hill which in turn relied on the district court's test in NEPACCO.241 The court
failed to distinguish between participation in the management of the subsidiary
and the management of the facility. Finally, at most, the parent should have
232. 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
233. Id. at 1203.
234. The section of the opinion is headed "Stockholder and Direct Participation in Management of Ambler
Site." Id. at 1203. Yet in the section summarizing its position, the court says that "a corporation which holds
stock in another corporation (e.g., a subsidiary) and actively participates in its management can be held liable for
cleanup costs..." Id. (emphasis added).
235. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,994 (E.D. Pa., 1985).
236. 712 F. Supp. at 1203. The court also relied on Kelly v. Arco Indus. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1214 (W.D.
Mich. 1989), but quoted that portion of the opinion that paraphrases CERCLA.
237. See the discussions of Shore Realt', supra text accompanying notes 144-57; Carolawn, supra text and
accompanying notes 214-18.
238. 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1203-04. (E.D. Pa. 1989).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1204. For a more complete discussion of Bunker Hill, see supra text accompanying notes 224-31.
241. See supra text accompanying note 209. The court of appeals had ruled on NEPACCO well berore
Nicolet was decided, which was not noted by the court in Nicolet. However, the district court opinion has some
continuing vitality. See supra text accompanying notes 199-213 and also note 213.
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been deemed an "operator" not an "owner," absent piercing the corporate
veil.242
Vermont v. Staco2 43 also involved the liability of corporate shareholders.
Staco, Inc. had produced mercury thermometers. It contaminated land on
which its plant was located. The land was owned by Keeper Corporation. The
plant was closed in 1984.244 Both corporations were wholly owned subsidiaries
of Chase Instruments Corporation. 245 The court granted the state's motion for
summary judgment and held both subsidiaries and the parent liable as under
section 9607(a)(1) without specifying which was an "owner" and which was an
"operator."2 6
Two individual stockholders of the parent corporation (one the majority
shareholder) held the positions of president of the parent and the chairman of
the board of directors of the parent.247 The court found that via their positions
they "participated in the control and management of Staco." 24 8 Another indi-
vidual defendant was the person who managed "the operations of the Staco's
plant." All three individuals "participated in the management and control of
Staco's operations . ... 24 The court said that all three individuals "as owning
and managing stockholders, are personally liable in their respective executive
capacities in the corporate structure. '250 If the court meant that each was so
involved so as to be an "operator" then liability is consistent with the statutory
language. 25'
In United States v. McGraw Edison Co.,252 the defendant corporation
owned only 49 percent of the corporation responsible for the disposal of the
hazardous waste. The parent filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that
it could not be held liable since it was a minority shareholder,253 and thus not
an owner or operator under CERCLA. The shareholder argued that the only
way to impose liability on it was to pierce the corporate veil, which the facts did
not support. The government alleged that this shareholder had, together with
the majority shareholder, participated in the operations of the subsidiary re-
242. In addition, the parent held a mortgage on the property owned by the subsidiary. The parent was
potentially liable as a mortgage holder if it participates in the operations of the site. See supra note 132 for a
discussion of lender liability when a lender forecloses on a mortgage.
243. 684 F. Supp. 822 (S.D. Vt. 1988)..
244. Id. at 825, 831.





250. Id. at 832.
251. The court is not clear whether it focused on the control the individuals had over the parent or over Staco
and its plant operations. Staco was the operator of the site. The parent was also arguably an operator according to
the court. (The court did not specify whether the parent's liability was as an owner or operator. Operator liability
is more appropriate since yet another subsidiary owned the site). If the focus was on the operation of the parent,
the individuals were at most operators of an operator of an operator. If the focus was on their management of the
plant, they were correctly considered "operators" of the facility within the meaning of CERCLA.
Finally, one individual was not a stockholder at all and thus the court's characterization is incorrect.
252. 718 F. Supp. 154 (W.D.N.Y. 1989).
253. Id. at 156.
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sponsible for the toxic waste disposal. 25 4 It argued that the case law supported
imposing liability on a shareholder who participated in the management of a
responsible corporation. 255 More specifically, the government maintained that
the majority and minority shareholders had agreed that the minority share-
holder would give certain technical advice to the corporation. There was evi-
dence that one person served as a corporate officer for both the minority stock-
holder and the responsible corporation. The court relied on the lower court
opinion in NEPACCO that held that one who owns "an interest in and who is
actively participating in its management can be held liable for the disposal of
hazardous waste. 2 56 The court did not discuss the obvious distinction between
the two cases: NEPACCO involved a majority shareholder, this case did not.
Like earlier cases, the court also failed to recognize that this particular portion
of NEPACCO was drawn into question since neither NEPACCO nor its share-
holders were technically owners or operators because the facility was owned by
a third party. The court did not discuss whether the shareholder's liability was
as an owner or as an operator. The court referred to the shareholder participa-
tion in the corporate activities without relating those activities to the facility in
order to establish liability under the statute. Since the facts were sufficiently in
dispute the court deferred its decision until further discovery had taken place.2 57
The principal shareholder/president who had responsibility for the man-
agement of the corporation which disposed improperly of hazardous substances
was held liable as an "operator" in International Clinical Laboratories, Inc. v.
Stevens.2 5 8
Another recent case provides a clear look at the statutory requirements and
also provides some guidelines as to who is and is not an "operator." In Riverside
Market Dev. Corp. v. International Bldg. Prods.,251 the court considered the
potential liability of a former corporate owner of a facility and its two share-
holders/officers. First, the court noted that neither shareholder could be an
"owner" and that liability could only be imposed as an "operator." The court
mistakenly referred to the secured creditor exception to the definition of "owner
or operator," but developed a test similar to several other courts to determine
operator status. The court said it would look at the "degree of participation in
the operations of the . . . facility."2 60 The majority shareholder owned 85 per-
cent of the stock, was chairperson of the board and was the principal source of
money. However, he was minimally involved in the operations at the facility and
the court granted summary judgment in his favor. The other shareholder owned
15 percent of the stock, was president, spent some of his time at the facility and
was involved with its operations, although the facts were not yet fully developed
to his participation. The court denied his motion for summary judgment since a
254. Id. at 157.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 157-58.
258. 710 F. Supp. 446, 471 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
259. Riverside Mkt. Dev. Corp. v. International Bldg. Prods., Slip. Op. No. 88-5317 (all references will be
made to Lexis page numbers) (E.D. La. May 23, 1990), 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6375.
260. Id. at 5.
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genuine issue of material fact existed. Although the distinction drawn between
the two shareholders is supported by the statute, a different test should apply to
the passive but controlling shareholder other than actual participation in the
management of the facility.261 Interestingly, the court was within the Fifth Cir-
cuit, where Joslyn reigns. The court distinguished Joslyn primarily because this
case involved individual shareholders who were also officers while Joslyn in-
volved a parent/subsidiary relationship. 2
b. The Power to Prevent Harm: A New Standard Emerges
A notable new standard in shareholder liability was announced in three
cases decided by the same court. Two of the cases are related, both called Kel-
ley v. Thomas Solvent Co.,26 5 and the third case is Kelley v. Arco Industries
Corp.26 4 The court was concerned about imposing liability on corporate share-
holders and officers and noted the failure of earlier courts to devise an "explicit
standard of liability" for such persons. The court set out to establish such an
explicit standard. 265
In Arco Industries, the defendant Ferguson was a shareholder owning less
than 5 percent of the outstanding shares.2 6  Ferguson was at various times the
president, chief operating officer, and a director; he reported directly to the
chief executive officer; at times, various managers of the plant reported to him;
he regularly toured the manufacturing areas of the plant; and he was involved
in setting disposal policies and other pollution-related activities. 267 The other
defendant, Matthaei, was the majority stockholder of Arco Industries; he had
"authority to elect the board of directors."26 Matthaei had limited contact with
the actual day to day operations of the contaminated site.
Both Thomas Solvent cases involved individuals who were shareholders
and occupied various positions in two related companies, Thomas Solvent Com-
pany and Thomas Development Company. These two companies were responsi-
ble for the pollution of several toxic waste sites. Thomas Solvent I involved the
liability of the two related companies and Richard Thomas. Richard Thomas
was the president of both corporations; he was a shareholder of Thomas Devel-
opment Company and also its secretary and director; he was a director of
Thomas Solvent Company and through a living trust established by him, he was
261. See infra text accompanying notes 377-80.
262. 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis at 9-10.
263. Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532 (W.D. Mich. 1989) ("Thomas Solvent I"), and Kelley
v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1554 (W.D. Mich. 1989) ("Thomas Solvent 11").
264. 723 F. Supp. 1214 (W.D. Mich. 1989). This opinion involved a motion to clarify an earlier order of the
court which had refused to dismiss the action against the defendants.
The Arco case was recently settled and the court approved a consent decree that requires the defendants.
primarily the corporate defendant, to clean up the site in question and set up a trust fund from which it will
reimburse the government and pay for the costs of cleanup. Civil penalties and attorneys fees were also agreed to.
For a summary of the settlement provisions see 4 Toxics L. Rep. 741 (Nov. 22, 1989).
265. 723 F. Supp. at 1216.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1217.
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its sole shareholder. 26 9  In Thomas Solvent II, Letha Thomas (Richard's
mother) was a director and secretary of Thomas Solvent Company, a share-
holder of Thomas Development, and, at times, the president of Thomas Devel-
opment. 27 0 With respect to the liability of these individuals, the court's opinion
is identical word for word in all three opinions-Arco Industries, Thomas Sol-
vent I, and Thomas Solvent 11.271
In each case, the court reviewed the earlier cases concerning the liability of
individuals for corporate wrongs.2 72 The court focused on the one factor that
appeared over and over in those earlier cases: control or the ability to control
the corporate acts.273 The court concluded that where CERCLA liability is con-
cerned, an individual may be held responsible for hazardous waste disposal even
though traditional corporate doctrines, such as piercing the corporate veil, do
not apply.27'
The court devised what it called the "prevention test:" liability can be im-
posed on one as an owner or operator if that individual in the close corporation
could have prevented or significantly abated the hazardous waste discharge that
is the basis of the claim. 75 The court attempted to set out specific factors it
would consider in determining responsibility under this test. Two types of fac-
tors can be found in the court's decision. 276 The first is the individual's power or
269. To discover all of these facts one needs to refer also to Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp.
1446, 1448 (W.D. Mich. 1988), yet another case concerning these companies. That case involved, among other
things, fraudulent conveyances made between various related companies.
270. 727 F. Supp. at 1563.
271. In fact the court says explicitly in Thomas Solvent I that it is adopting its decision in Arco Industries.
Thomas Solvent I, 727 F. Supp. at 1541.
272. Specifically, the court reviewed the circuit court opinion in NEPACCO, 810 F.2d 726, discussed supra
text accompanying notes 206, 211 and infra notes 283-90; Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032, discussed supra text
accompanying notes 144-57; Vermont v. Staco, 645 F. Supp. 822, discussed supra text accompanying notes 243-
51: United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, discussed infra text accompanying notes 298-302; United States v.
Carolawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,699, discussed supra text accompanying notes 213-17, and Idaho v. Bunker Hill,
635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986), discussed supra text and accompanying notes 223-30.
273. Thomas Solvent 1, 727 F. Supp. at 1542-43; Thomas Solvent II, 727 F. Supp. at 1561-62; Arco Indus-
tries, 723 F. Supp. at 1218-19.
274. Thomas Solvent 1, 727 F. Supp. at 1543; Thomas Solvent 11, 727 F. Supp. at 1561-62; Arco Industries,
723 F. Supp. at 1219.
275. Thomas Solvent 1, 727 F. Supp. at 1544; Thomas Solvent II, 727 F. Supp. at 1561-62; Arco Industries,
723 F. Supp. at 1219.
276. The court refers to factors it will consider three times using three separate sets of terms. The first time,
the court states that it will consider "the corporate individual's degree of authority in general and specific respon-
sibility for health and safety practices, including hazardous waste disposal." Thomas Solvent 1, 727 F. Supp. at
1543; Thomas Solvent 11, 727 F. Supp. at 1561; Arco Industries, 723 F. Supp. at 1219.
The second time:
... evidence of an individual's authority to control, among other things, waste handling prac-
tices--evidence such as whether the individual holds the position of officer or director, especially where
there is a co-existing management position; distribution of power within the corporation, including position
in the corporate hierarchy and percentage of shares owned. Weighed along with the power factor will be
evidence of responsibility undertaken for waste disposal practices, including evidence of responsibility un-
dertaken and neglected, as well as affirmative attempts to prevent unlawful hazardous waste disposal.
Besides responsibility neglected, it is important to look at the positive efforts of one who took clear mea-
sures to avoid or abate the hazardous waste damage. Therefore, the Court will look to this evidence when
determining liability by the "prevention" test.
Thomas Solvent 1, 727 F. Supp. at 1543-44; Thomas Solvent II. 727 F. Supp. at 1562; Arco Industries, 723 F.
Supp. at 1219-20.
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authority to control the disposal of the hazardous waste. In this respect the
person's position in a corporation is important. A person with the authority to
control all corporate matters, such as a sole shareholder, would have the type of
power described here. The second factor is the individual's responsibility for the
waste disposal itself. In this context, a person may lack power over the corpora-
tion but be responsible due to the responsibility of his or her particular job. The
court is not clear on whether both factors must be present to impose liability.
Most revealing is perhaps the court's statement that "weighed along with the
power factor will be evidence of responsibility undertaken for waste disposal
practices . "... ,,1 This seems to indicate the court must consider both factors.
It does not necessarily mean that the shareholder must meet both criteria
(power over and actual responsibility for waste disposal) especially since after
discussing these factors, the court reiterates that the focus of the inquiry is on
whether the defendant could have prevented or significantly abated the release
of hazardous substances.27 8 Thus, the factors are indicators of persons who
might be in a position to prevent the harm. The court does not say whether such
persons are "owners" or "operators." This test was followed recently in Qua-
dion Corp. v. Mache,2 7 9 when the court refused to grant a shareholder's motion
to dismiss. Although the focus of this discussion is not economic, one cannot
help noticing that this test furthers economic efficiency in the cleanup of sites
contaminated with toxic substances and provides incentives for proper disposal
in the future by placing the costs on those who can most easily or cheaply avoid
them.280 Specifically, placing liability on shareholders who are in a position to
Finally, the court notes that its focus is different from both the veil piercing standards and the corporate actor
rule. The court will analyze the "power or authority" of the individual, "a factor not used in traditional standards
for tortious conduct by corporate individuals." Further it "will look at responsibility undertaken for waste disposal
practices as it relates to the prevention test." Thomas Solvent 1. 727 F. Supp. at 1544; Thomas Solvent II, 727 F.
Supp. at 1562; Arco Industries, 723 F. Supp. at 1220.
277. Thomas Solvent 1, 727 F. Supp. at 1544.
278. Thomas Solvent 1, 727 F. Supp. at 1545; Thomas Solvent 11, 727 F. Supp. at 1562; Arco Industries,
723 F. Supp. at 1220.
279. 738 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. Ill. 1990). This court too failed to distinguish between the term "owner" and
"operator."
280. One method of determining how to optimally allocate accident costs, is to place the costs on one who
can most cheaply avoid the accident, i.e., on the "cheapest cost avoider." G. CALABRESI, THE CosTs oF ACCIDENTS
135-39 (1970). If there were no transaction costs, the market would allocate costs of accidents on the appropriate
persons to the appropriate degree. Id. at 135; see also id. at 69 and 134 n.3, referring to the Coase Theorem. The
market approach may not work because of transaction costs, imperfect information or other factors. There are,
however, persons who can better or more cheaply avoid accidents and the costs should be placed on them. In most
cases the polluting corporation itself will be the cheapest cost avoider. The question then becomes: who is the
cheapest cost avoider if we know that the corporation itself is not a candidate since it cannot pay its liabilities.
Dean Calabresi sets up three "guidelines" for identifying the cheapest cost avoider: I) avoidance of high
administrative costs; 2) avoidance of externalization of costs; and 3) finding those who can be most easily
(cheaply) be convinced to avoid the accident. Id. at 142-52. Dean Calabresi calls the latter the "best briber"
guideline. Id. at 135, 150-52. But he makes it clear this is not meant to have any negative connotation, rather he
means a "legitimate inducement." Id. at 135 n.2.
Avoiding high administrative costs means that if the administrative costs of finding the cheapest cost avoider
are very high it may be cheaper and more desireable to place the costs on one who is not the cheapest cost avoider
but who can be found at a lower cost, thus resulting in a net gain to society (an "efficient result"). Id. at 143-44.
In the toxic waste context, once we have identified the responsible corporation, it will not be difficult to identify its
principals, agents and shareholders in most cases. Thus, the administrative expense guideline is not a bar to
considering shareholders to be cheapest cost avoiders.
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prevent the harm provides an incentive to them to direct proper disposal. This
proper disposal will be paid for initially by the corporation and eventually
passed on to the consumers (assuming an efficient market). This results in the
internalization of costs and ultimately supports efficiency.2 81
4. Summary of Decisions Regarding Liability as an "Owner or Operator"
Over a dozen cases have grappled with the question of whether a share-
holder is an "owner" or "operator." No single test has been imposed by those
courts but an important factor to most of the courts was the shareholder's con-
trol over the corporation, the facilities or the waste disposal. This trend has
culminated in the "prevention test" just discussed. The final part of this article
discusses the appropriateness of these tests and other tests in considering share-
holder liability.282
In spite of the number of cases concerning the liability of shareholders as
"owners or operators" courts continue to fail to pay sufficient attention to the
language of the statute. The lower court in NEPACCO was careless in holding
the corporation and its shareholders liable as an owner when the site was owned
by an unrelated third party. More than half of the courts have been careless in
Avoiding externalization of costs means internalizing costs. Internalizing costs will result in the production
and sale of an optimal amount of a product. See, e.g.. A.M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECNOM-
ics 86-88 (1983); G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 110- 11 (1966). This is perceived to create efficient results
and therefore be desirable in a market economy. To internalize costs means that all of the costs of making a
particular product are reflected in its price, not only the costs of raw materials but also the social costs such as
compensation for injuries sustained to victims as a result of the product. See POLINSKY, supra at Il1: STIGLER
supra at I ll. Arguably, if all the social costs are included in the product price, individuals operating in the free
market will set the optimal level of a particular activity. CALAERESI, supra at 69-70.
So. for example, if a choice would mean that taxpayers would pay for the cost of the accident, then that
choice should be excluded. Id. at 144. In the toxic waste situation, if the responsible corporation or other responsi-
ble person does not pay for the cleanup, Superfund will pay for it. Superfund is funded through general tax
revenues, taxes on corporations generally and taxes on those industries perceived to be associated with hazardous
waste - the chemical industry and the petroleum industry, for example. See supra note 114. Each of these
sources of funding will cause some level of externalization. To the extent the cost is placed on the taxpayer
generally, that portion of the cost is completely externalized. Similarly, to the extent the tax is placed on corpora-
tions generally, there is a large degree of externalization since some corporations may be completely unrelated to
the toxic waste industry and others may be only distantly related. Even in the case of the tax on industries related
to or part of the hazardous waste industry, the taxes will still cause some externalization since these taxes are not
specific to the level of pollution for which each member of the industry is responsible. This form of externalization
is caused by the failure of "insufficient subcategorization," that is, the inability to efficiently determine exactly
who is causing which costs, and to precisely what extent. CALABRES, supra at 145-47.
However, ir the costs are placed upon the shareholders, there is an incentive created for shareholders to avoid
this improper disposal and place the cost of avoidance on the corporation itself - exactly where it should be
placed in order to internalize costs.
Finally, we can ascertain who the cheapest cost avoider is by considering who can be convinced most easily or
cheaply to avoid the "accident." In the hazardous substance context the shareholders can be fairly easily con-
vinced or "bribed" into avoiding the accident in order to avoid personal liability. Thus, the shareholder does
appear to be a possible cheapest cost avoider although others who make decisions for the corporation, such as
officers, may also fit the role.
Part of the foregoing discussion grew out of a conversation with Professor Francis McGovern regarding the
Kelley cases just discussed in the text.
281. See POLINSKY, supra note 280 and STIGLER, supra note 280.
282. See Infra Part IV.A.3.
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their use of the terms "owner" and "operator. '28 3 Failure to make these distinc-
tions can lead to imposition of liability on shareholders whenever the corpora-
tions they own are responsible under CERCLA since "owners" are responsible
without regard to their involvement with or participation in the business. A
shareholder of a corporation which owns the facility, is not an "owner" of the
facility-unless the corporate veil is pierced. A shareholder may be an "opera-
tor," however, depending on its level of involvement and the test adopted.
Courts have also failed to focus on the language of the statute that imposes
liability on the owners or operators of a facility and have failed to tie manage-
ment of the corporation to the operation of the facility.
C. Liability Under Sections 9607(a)(3) and (a)(4) for Arranging the Disposal
of or Transporting the Hazardous Waste
Beyond liability as an owner or operator, a shareholder may also be liable
under section 9607(a)(3) if the shareholder arranged for the disposal of the
hazardous substance. This was the basis upon which the circuit court imposed
liability on one of the individual defendants in the NEPACCO case.2 8 4 Recall
that Lee, the vice president and shareholder had approved of a farm as a dispo-
sal site and had authorized the services of two persons as disposers. Section
9607(a)(3) imposes liability on "any person who . ..arranged for disposal or
treatement. . . of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by
any other party or entity at any facility . . "..,,85 Lee first argued that he per-
sonally did not own or posses the substances, rather the corporation did. Lee
had authority to control the hazardous substance and in his position as plant
supervisor, he had direct responsibility for and "immediate supervision" of actu-
ally arranging the disposal at the farm. 8" In the court's view, this control made
Lee one who "possessed" the waste within the meaning of the statute.287 How-
ever, this discussion of possession of the waste was unnecessary. The language
of section 9607(a)(3) does not require that the hazardous substance be owned
or possessed by the one upon whom liability is being asserted. Rather it imposes
liability upon anyone who arranged for the disposal of toxic waste owned or
possessed by the arranger or "by any other person or entity. 288
Lee's main argument was that he merely carried out his corporate responsi-
bility and could not be held personally liable. The court rejected this argument
and imposed liability on Lee through a combination of section 9607(a)(3) and
283. Specifically: Joslyn, Conservation Chemical, Carolawn, Bunker Hill. Staco. the Kelley cases, Nicolet
and Quadion Corp.
284. 810 F.2d 726, 744 (8th Cir. 1986).
285. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(3) (West Supp. 1990).
286. 810 F.2d at 743.
287. Id. at 743-44.
288. This section imposes liability on: "any person . . . who arranged for disposal or treatment ... of haz-
ardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other person or entity, at any facility. . . owned or
operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances (emphasis added)."
Taken apart, this section has four requirements: 1) a person must have arranged for the disposal or treatment
2) of a hazardous substance owned by him or any other person or entity 3) the arrangement was for disposal (or
treatment) at a facility owned or operated by another party or entity and 4) the substances were disposed of (or
treated) at that facility. The lower court seems to have read this section correctly. See 579 F. Supp. at 847.
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the corporate actor rule.289 First, the court said Lee was liable because he "per-
sonally arranged for the transportation and disposal of hazardous substances"
for the corporation and had thereby participated in the violations of CER-
CLA.290 His liability was personal, "not derivative."2 91 The court then went on
to cite a line of cases imposing liability on corporate officers for their tortious
acts, i.e., the corporate actor rule.
The activities of NEPACCO and its shareholders and officers also gave rise
to another case, United States v. Bliss.292 In that case, Lee and Michaels (the
majority shareholder and president, who had not been directly involved in the
disposal in the NEPACCO case) met with several people to arrange for the
disposal of some of the hazardous substances accumulating from NEPACCO's
operations. These persons then hired Mr. Bliss to dispose of the waste.293 The
court held NEPACCO, Michaels and Lee responsible as arrangers under sec-
tion 9607(a)(3).2 9' Lee and Michaels raised the same arguments just discussed
with regard to the NEPACCO case. Relying on the Eighth Circuit opinion in
the earlier NEPACCO case, the court rejected these arguments. 295
In United States v. Mottolo,2 9 the Court said that the sole shareholder/
president and treasurer of a responsible corporation might be liable under sec-
tion 9607(a)(3), which imposes liability for arranging for disposal.2 97 The facts
concerning his involvement with the disposal were in dispute and thus summary
judgment for the shareholder was denied.29 8
In United States v. Ward, 299 a president and principal shareholder of the
responsible corporation was held liable on a motion for summary judgment as
one who arranged for the disposal of hazardous wastes under section
9607(a)(3). 30 0 The defendant had arranged with another individual to haul and
dispose of PCB contaminated oil from the corporate defendant's site. The
hauler and disposer loaded the contaminated oil into a tank and placed it in a
van. He slowly leaked the oil along roadways and on a military reservation. 30 1
The court rejected the defendant's argument that liability should only be im-
posed if the defendant knew of the improper disposal and held that the statute
289. This principle is discussed supra text accompanying notes 91-103.
290. 810 F. 2d at 744.
291. Id.
292. 667 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Mo. 1989).
293. Id. at 1303.
294. Id. at 1306.
295. Id.
296. 605 F. Supp. 898 (D.N.H. 1985).
297. Id. at 913-14.
298. Id.
299. 618 F. Supp. 884 (D.N.C. 1985).
300. Id. at 893-98.
301. Id. at 890-91.
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required no such knowledge.302 Further, such a requirement would encourage
those involved with toxic substances to close their eyes and avoid liability.303
In United States v. Northernaire Plating Co.,30 4 the court granted the gov-
ernment's motion for summary judgment against the sole shareholder/president
of the corporation who had arranged for the disposal of the waste. 30 5 In
Northernaire there were several defendants: the corporation, which had manu-
factured and disposed of the waste, the lessor, and the president/ shareholder.
The court held all three could be responsible under CERCLA. The lessor was
clearly an "owner," Northernaire, the corporate defendant, was an "operator,"
and the shareholder/president was responsible since he arranged for the
disposal.30 6
In City of New York v. Exxon Corp.,07 the city sought to hold a parent
corporation, Refinement International, Inc., liable for the illegal disposal of
toxic waste by its subsidiary, Newtown Refining Corp.308 Bribery gained the
individual culprits access to the city landfills for the illegal disposal. 3 9 The city
sought to hold the parent corporation liable directly under CERCLA as one
who arranged for the disposal under section 9607(a)(3) or as one who accepted
hazardous waste for disposal under section 9607(a)(4). 310
The court applied the standards used for imposing liability on shareholders
as owners or operators under section 9607(a)(2) to this case concerning liability
under section 9607(a)(3) and (a)(4).31 ' The court reviewed the standards im-
posed by these courts which determined whether a particular shareholder was
an "owner or operator." The court concluded that the question was "whether
[the parent] was 'so intimately involved in the operation' of [the subsidiary]
.. .with a sufficient degree of control over and participation in [the subsidi-
302. Id. at 895. Further, the court may have disbelieved Ward regarding his knowledge of the activity since
I) several alterations were made intentionally to the tank to allow it to leak the waste as desired and these
alterations were made at the corporate defendant's plant using its employees, id. at 891, and 2) the hauler/
disposer had told Ward about the initial dumping at the military reservation. Id.
303. Id. at 895. The defendant also raised the statutory defense that a third party caused the improper
disposal. See supra note 131 regarding these statutory defenses to CERCLA liability. The defense is limited to
defendants who have not contracted with the third party. Here, either the individual or the corporate defendant
had contracted with the third party for the disposal. Id. at 897.
304. 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
305. Id. at 749.
306. Id at 747. Two years later, the court apportioned the costs among the three defendants based upon
equitable factors. The corporation and shareholder/president were responsible for two-thirds of the damage; the
landowner one-third. United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., No. G84-1113CA7, Slip. Op. (W.D. Mich. Sept.
1989) (1989 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15913 at 3-10).
307. 112 Bankr. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
308. Id. at 542. The opinion is somewhat confusing on the ownership of seven related corporations. The court
says that the subsidiary received the assets and stock of seven related companies comprising a waste oil business.
Id. The court also says that an individual, Mahler, was the "sole shareholder" of each of these companies (with
the exception of one, in which he owned 75%). Thus, it is unclear whether these seven companies were subsidiar-
ies of Newtown or otherwise related.
309. Id. at 541, 542.
310. Id. at 542, 547.
311. Id. at 547-48. The court cited and discussed many of the cases discussed in the preceding section includ-
ing Shore Realty, NEPACCO, Kayser-Roth, and Bunker Hill.
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ary's] affairs that it is liable as a transporter" or an arranger.32 After an exten-
sive review of the facts the court held that the parent was in fact "sufficiently
involved in the affairs of its subsidiary, Newton, to be held directly liable as a
generator or transporter of hazardous waste." 313
In earlier cases, such as NEPACCO, liability was imposed upon individuals
who actually arranged for the disposal on behalf of the corporation. Similarly, a
parent which actually arranges or transports the hazardous materials would be
liable as an arranger or a transporter. Beyond direct arranging or transporting,
what facts will indicate that the shareholder can be liable as an arranger or as a
transporter? As in the case of the interpretation of "owner or operator," we
need to define what a person who "arranged" for the disposal means,31 4 or who
"accepts" the waste "for transport. ' 315
In the cases which determined operator status, courts generally looked to
the amount of involvement the shareholder in the management of or activities at
the site or the corporation. Sufficient involvement could render one an "opera-
tor." The very term "operator" connotes one who has a certain level of involve-
ment with the activity concerned. The concepts of "arranger" and "trans-
porter," however, are of a different sort. One who is so involved with the
activities of a corporation or site so as to be an operator, might not be a person
"who arranged for disposal" or who "accepted any hazardous substance for
transport." These latter two liability provisions imply a more direct involvement
on part of the shareholder. While the "prevention test" recently set forth by the
Western District of Michigan might serve to identify those who have sufficient
control so as to be said to effectively "operate" the corporation or facility, the
test is not sufficiently specific to identify those who "arranged" for disposal or
"accepted" waste for transportation.
312. Id. at 548 (quoting in part Colorado v. Idarado Mining, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,578,
20,579 (D. Colo. 1987).
313. Id. at 552. The list of factors establishing this connection included:
I.Newtown was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Refinement;
2.Refinement had the power to appoint Newtown's officers and directors, to replace them as it saw fit, and
to augment them with its own personnel;
3.Newtown and Refinement had certain directors and officers in common;
4.Refinement funded Mahler's salary while he was president of Newtown;
5.Refinement had ultimate authority over all of Newtown's major expenditures;
6.Refinement negotiated the purchase of fifteen trucks by Newtown, arranged financing for the purchase,
and guaranteed the loan for the purchase;
7.Refinement guaranteed another of Newtown's loans for S200,000;
8.Refinement contributed S3 million to Newtown's operations in 18 months, because Newtown was losing
several million dollars per year;
9.Refinement occasionally had direct contacts with Newtown's customers regarding their accounts;
10.Refinement paid for Newtown's insurance coverage.
Later in the opinion, the court mentions the concept of awareness, but it is unclear what its relevance is or what
part it plays in the test for liability. The court discusses whether the parent was aware of the disposal business of
its subsidiary and found that it was aware of this aspect of the subsidiary's business. Id. at 550-52. Whether it was
aware of the illegal nature of the operation was irrelevant-although the facts tended to show the parent was
probably aware of this aspect as well. Id. Further, the court believed that the parent had an "affirmative duty to
ensure that its subsidiary was properly protecting the public from the environmental health and safety hazards
inherent in" the business of the subsidiary. Id.
314. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(3) (West Supp. 1990).
315. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4) (West Supp. 1990).
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In Exxon, the court imposed liability on the parent because it had exer-
cised control and participated in the affairs of the subsidiary, which was an
arranger or transporter. The court in Exxon was stretching the limits of the
statute when it applied standards developed in owner/operator cases to the
question of arranger or transporter liability since arranging and transporting
require more direct involvement. However, as discussed in the next section such
liability is both supported by the intent of Congress to place liability on those
"responsible" for the harm and is also consistent with principles of accident
responsibility.
The liability imposed in Exxon also raises the question that is raised by the
Joslyn decision: whether a shareholder can be held directly liable under CER-
CLA when facts do not support piercing the corporate veil. This tension be-
tween traditional corporate law and CERCLA is explored in the next part.
IV. GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE DECISIONMAKING
A. Judicial Decisionmaking
Assume Corporation X, manufactures pesticides and creates toxic waste as
a by-product. It is owned by Ms. Smith, who controls and actually manages all
of the affairs of the corporation and the plant where the pesticides are pro-
duced. The toxic waste is regularly spilled in the backyard of the plant. In this
case Corporation X is an "operator" and the question is whether Ms. Smith can
also be held liable as an "operator" directly under CERCLA.
Courts confronted with the question of shareholder liability under CER-
CLA must engage in three inquiries. The first inquiry involves statutory inter-
pretation and asks whether CERCLA itself can and does impose liability on
shareholders of closely held corporations. If the court concludes that CERCLA
does impose such liability, then the second inquiry focuses on the interplay and
possible conflict between CERCLA and the state corporation laws granting lim-
ited liability to shareholders. This interplay involves questions of the scope of
federal common law and of preemption. The third inquiry is to determine
whether a shareholder is liable under CERCLA under a given set of facts. It
requires courts to develop a test for determining when a person is or is not an
"operator" (or an "arranger" or "transporter").
This part concludes that shareholders can be liable directly under CER-
CLA and that state law limited liability is not a bar. The courts can and should
create a uniform federal rule of decision, with guidelines, regarding whether a
shareholder is an "operator."
1. Can CERCLA Impose Liability Directly on Shareholders?
a. Preliminary Matters and a "Common Sense" Approach
Shareholders have been held directly liable under CERCLA as "owners or
operators," "arrangers" and as "transporters." In order to narrow the focus
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somewhat to analyze shareholder liability under CERCLA, the inquiry shall be
whether a shareholder can be an "operator. 31 1
Deciding whether a shareholder of a corporate operator can also be an op-
erator includes a question of whether there can be more than one operator.
Congress contemplated the possibility that multiple parties could be owners or
operators. For example, Congress exempted from the definition of "owner or
operator" certain secured lenders. 317 If a corporation was found liable as an
operator and its secured lender was also found to be an operator, the latter
finding would not absolve the corporation of responsibility as an operator.
Common sense tells us that a person should not be excluded from the possi-
bility of being an operator merely because he owns stock in a corporate opera-
tor. For example, assume Mr. Jones promotes himself as a "Pesticide Plant Op-
erator" and his business is running, managing and otherwise operating pesticide
companies. Corporation X, the pesticide producer, hired Mr. Jones to run all
aspects of the business. Mr. Jones would be an "operator." If Mr. Jones were
now given a share of stock in Corporation X, his status should not be affected.
The First Circuit agrees with this reading of the statute. It said that by impos-
ing liability on owners or operators, CERCLA implies that "a person who is an
operator of a facility is not protected from liability by the legal structure of
ownership. '3 8
b. Statutory Interpretation
This section looks at the statute itself and several ways of interpreting it in
an effort to determine whether a shareholder of an operator can also be an
operator.
(1) Plain Meaning
CERCLA does not define "operator" as an independent term. Rather, it
defines "owner or operator" somewhat circuitously as "any person owning or
operating such facility. '319 Although the United States Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute,320
it looks freely to legislative history to ascertain the legislative intent or meaning
of the statute.3 21 While courts sometimes turn to dictionary definitions to ascer-
tain the plain meaning of a term, such definitions are not very helpful here. One
dictionary defines "operator" as "one that produces a physical effect or engages
316. After this analysis follows a discussion of the standards to apply when considering shareholders as "ar-
rangers" and "transporters." As discussed earlier, shareholders are not "owners" unless the corporate veil is
pierced.
317. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 327-34.
318. United States v. Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d 24, 26 (Ist Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 957 (1991).
319. See supra note 136.
320. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
321. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542-44 (1940); United States v. Dickerson,
310 U.S. 554, 562 (1940). For a review of current Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the use of legislative
history in construing statutes see Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 Am. U.L. REv. 277 (1990).
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himself in the mechanical aspects of any process or activity. '322 A person who
effectuates the activities at a facility can be an operator. That person could be
almost anyone: officer, manager, shareholder or employee.
(2) Legislative Intent
In enacting CERCLA, Congress said that it intended to protect the public
from hazardous waste sites by providing for cleanup and to "provide for liability
of persons responsible for releases of hazardous waste at such sites.1 323 What
did Congress mean by "responsible"-did it mean responsible in some narrow
legal sense or did it use the term in a more ordinary, everyday sense? Congress
created the rules of liability in CERCLA so Congress would not have meant to
refer to another independent legal standard (such as negligence) for "responsi-
ble" in the legislative history. A corporation which owned a contaminated facil-
ity might be "responsible" for the contamination. The corporation acted
through individuals, however, who operated or managed the subsidiary and con-
trolled the activities at the facility. In its everyday sense, persons "responsible"
would include those individuals who made the decision on behalf of a corpora-
tion to dispose of hazardous waste improperly or who carried out the improper
disposal and had the power to halt it. "Responsible" would include a parent
corporation which actively manages a subsidiary or directs its waste disposal. It
would include a shareholder (individual or corporate) who controls the opera-
tions and management of a facility or the gubsidiary. All of these persons are to
some extent "responsible" in the everyday sense of the word for the disposal. To
interpret the statute consistent with the intent of Congress means including
such persons within the definition of "operator." A number of courts have fo-
cussed on this Congressional intent to place the cost on those who were "respon-
sible" for the problem in holding liable those who participated in the manage-
ment of the site, directed the disposal or otherwise affected the disposal
activities. 324
Congress also specifically intended to place the cost of cleanup on indus-
tries and consumers who have or will benefit from products that cause the pro-
322. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1581 (Unabridged, 1981). Another definition of
operator is "one who does or effects something, a worker, an agent ..... One who performs the practical or
mechanical operations belonging to any process, business or scientific investigation; a person professionally or
officially engaged in doing this . . . .One who works a business, undertaking, etc." THE OXFORD ENGLISH Dic-
TIONARY, 1995-96 (Compact Edition, 1971).
323. H.R. REP. No. 1016, Part 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 US, CODE. CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6119 (emphasis added).
324. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990)
and cases cited therein. City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 112 Bankr. 540, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) and cases cited
therein. Although these cases refer to earlier cases rather than to the legislative history directly, the reference to
the Congressional intent is clear in each case.
One could argue that this Congressional intent is indeterminate. Specifically, one could say that when Con-
gress intended to place liability on corporate managers and shareholders it was clear and direct. For example,
Congress explicitly places liability in the form of a penalty on certain persons for failing to withhold specified
taxes. 26 U.S.C. § 672(a) (1989). Congress has not been so explicit in the CERCLA context. However, the
congressional intent to place cleanup costs on those "responsible" is some indication of how to interpret the stat-
ute. it is but one of several indications supporting the construction that shareholders can be within the group of
those who might be liable as operators.
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duction of hazardous waste.325 This Congressional intent shows an intent to in-
ternalize costs.3 28 One way to assure that an entity properly "internalizes" costs
is to place responsibility on those who control the activities at the facility or at
the corporation. Potential liability will encourage those in charge to dispose of
the hazardous substances properly, which will be paid for by the corporation
and ultimately the consumer. 327 Interpreting "operator" to include shareholders
who occupy positions of power, who control, or who actually participate in the
management of the facility or the waste disposal, will further these Congres-
sional goals. 328
Another indication of legislative intent to impose liability on shareholders
who operate the facility can be found in the exception for secured lenders. Con-
gress provided that the term "owner or operator" does not include a "person,
who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility holds indi-
cia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facil-
ity."'3 29 The exception shows, however, that Congress contemplated the fact that
secured creditors could be liable under CERCLA as an "owner or operator" if
they met the statutory requirements. Further, Congress related the exception
for secured creditors to their involvement in the management of the facility.
This shows an intent to impose liability when the creditor is active, not passive.
This liability is similar to "operator liability."330
325. In imposing taxes on various industries-primarily the petro-chemical industries-to fund a significant
portion of "Superfund," the Senate Committee on Environmental and Public Works explained as follows:
[flinancing the Fund primarily from fees paid by industry is the most equitable and rational method of
broadly spreading the costs of past, present and future releases of hazardous substances among all those
industrial sectors and consumers who benefit from such substances. The concept of a fund financed
largely by appropriations was not adopted. A largely appropriated fund establishes a precedent adverse to
the public interest . . . .Too often the general taxpayer is asked to pick up the bill for problems he did
not create; when costs can be more appropriately allocated to specific economic sectors and consumers,
such costs should not be added to the public debt (emphasis added).
S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). Although this Report explained an earlier version of the legislation,
this funding was adopted in CERCLA, with minor changes in the division of taxes imposed on the various petro-
chemical industries. See, Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensa-
tion and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COL.UM. J. ENVTL L. I, 12 (1982).
Courts have also referred to this Congressional intent to place the cost on those who "created and profited
from the sites and upon the Chemical industry as a whole." United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co.,
810 F.2d 726, 734 (8th Cir. 1986).
326. For a discussion of cost internalization see supra notes 280-81 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 281.
328. This is also consistent with the approach of placing the liability on the "least cost avoider," discussed
earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 280-81.
329. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West 1983 & Supp. 1989). See supra note 132.
330. Arguably the secured creditor exception only applies to secured creditors that are "owners" since it
excepts a shareholder who has an "indicia of ownership" to protect its security interest. It does not apply to the
creditor as an "operator," yet courts have not been clear regarding its application. The recent decision in United
States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990), considered the liability of a secured lender who did
not foreclose on its interest in the real property but took over the personal property in order to liquidate it. These
facts may indicate operator liability. The court, however, did not consider the question of operator liability but
refused to grant summary judgment for the creditor because it did not meet the exception for secured lenders
since it had participated in the management of the corporation. Thus, the court in Fleet Factors created a third
category of lender liability. Creditors can be liable as owners when they foreclose (and are no longer within the
secured creditor exception). They can be liable as operators. Third, a creditor can be liable because it has an
"ownership" interest (i.e., security interest) and partipates in the management of the facility. Seemingly, this is a
lesser standard than required for operator liability.
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In the corporate hierarchy, shareholders occupy a place in the corporation
while the typical creditor is a lender to the corporation. Creditors are generally
perceived to be further removed from the corporation than shareholders. Under
this structure the creditor will be paid before the shareholder should the corpo-
ration liquidate. Yet it has been long recognized that a creditor can become too
involved with a debtor so as to lose its status with respect to other creditors. For
example, a creditor's claim may be subordinated to other debts under the doc-
trine of equitable subordination.33 1 However, the creditor still maintains its posi-
tion in the hierarchy over shareholders.
If Congress intended to hold secured parties liable when they participate in
the management of the facility3 2 or are operators, then, a fortiori, Congress
intended to hold liable shareholders in a closely held corporation who are simi-
larly involved33 3 since they occupy a lower position in the corporate hierarchy.
(3) Remedial Nature of the Statute
The primary purpose of CERCLA is to provide for the cleanup of sites
contaminated with hazardous substances. 334 CERCLA is remedial in nature. As
a general principle of statutory interpretation, courts are to construe remedial
statutes broadly. In the CERCLA context courts have recognized that CER-
CLA is remedial335 and is to be liberally construed.3 3 6 According to the Elev-
enth Circuit, "ambiguous statutory terms should be construed to favor liability
for the costs incurred by the government" in order to achieve this remedial
purpose of CERCLA.3 3 7 Under this approach, the term "operator" should be
construed broadly and any doubt about whether a shareholder can be an opera-
331. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) and Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co.. 306 U.S. 307
(1939), the two seminal cases concerning the doctrine.
Another example is the creditor who exercises too much control over the debtor may be deemed an "insider"
and be subject to a preference period of one year instead of three months in the event of bankruptcy. In this case,
the creditor still maintains its position in the hierarchy above the shareholders.
332. The meaning of the phrase in connection with lender liability generally is discussed supra text accompa-
nying note 132.
333. This argument should not be confused with the argument courts have used to reason that a shareholder
who holds indicia of ownership and participates in the management is an owner (e.g., New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (1984)). This section by its terms is applicable to those who hold the indicia of
ownership to protect a security interest, which is not the same as a share of stock. See supra text accompanying
notes 144-57.
334. H.R. REP. No. 1016, Part 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONo &
ADMIN. NEws 6119.
335. United States v. Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d 24 (Ist Cir. 1990), cert. denied, I l S. Ct. 957 (1991); United
States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11 th Cir. 1990) (stating CERCLA is "overwhelmingly reme-
dial") citing Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11 th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986).
336. United States v. Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, I I I S. Ct. 957 (1991); Florida
Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990), citing United States v.
Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir. 1986), discussed supra text accompanying notes
206, 211, 283-90.
But see Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988) (declining to
interpret § 9607 liberally so as to hold a contractor, who had built a plant to an owner's specifications,
responsible).
337. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990).
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tor, independent of the corporation, should be resolved in favor of the
government.
2. The Interplay Between State Corporate Law of Limited Liability and
CERCLA
a. Federal Common Law
Interpreting CERCLA is a matter for the federal courts.338  Deciding
whether a shareholder is or may be an "operator" could be viewed as either 1)
filling a gap in the federal statute or 2) stautory interpretation. In either case
deciding whether a shareholder is directly liable under CERCLA could be con-
sidered to be the creation of federal common law, since the line between statu-
tory interpretation and common law is far from clear.339
Most authorities have cast the questions regarding federal common law as
a two part test: 1) whether the matter is subject to federal or state law and 2) if
it is subject to federal law, whether the court should look to state law for the
content of the rule or develop its own federal rule of decision."'
The first prong of the test is met in any CERCLA action since a gap must
be filled or a term interpreted in a federal statute.34 1 Federal common law is
also created to protect the interests of the United States, e.g., when the United
States is a party to the suit 342 or has a strong financial interest in the out-
338. The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over CERCLA matters, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(b) (West
1983 & Supp. 1989). They will be the primary interpreters of the term "operator."
The presumption that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction and that state courts may decide
rights established by federal law does not apply when Congress grants exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts.
See Tafflin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792, 795 (1990). Further, if a state court happens to rule on a matter within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts (e.g., by way of a defense raised by a party) there is some indication
that little effect should be given to the state court ruling. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 668
(1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
339. "The demarcation between 'statutory interpretation' or 'constitutional interpretation,' on the one hand,
and judge-made law on the other, is not a sharp line. Statutory interpretation shades into judicial lawmaking on a
spectrum, as specific evidence of legislative purpose with respect to the issue at hand attenuates." BATOR. MELT-
ZER. MISHKIN. SHAPIRO. HART & WECHSLER'S. THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 863 (3d ed.
1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. See also Field, supra note 24, at 890-96. Cases creating federal common
law have concerned not only matters traditionally regarded as "common law," see. e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (requiring the development of federal common law to decide the government's
recovery on a check) but also matters of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570
(1955) (concerning the interpretation of "children" under the Copyright Act).
340. Field, supra note 24, at 886 and authorities cited therein; E. CHEMERINSKY. FEDERAL JURISDICTION §
6.2.1, 298 (1989). See also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 339, at 866. Professor Field has argued that only the
second prong of this two part test is necessary. She argues that federal common law can only be "made" in cases
involving questions based upon the Constitution, a federal statute, or other federal interest. Cases based on these
grounds will automatically satisfy the first prong: that a federal interest is involved. Field, supra note 24, at 950-
53.
341. Regarding the federal courts power generally to create federal common law when there is a gap, see
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973) and Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal
Law". Competence and Discretion in the Choice of lational and State Rules of Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797,
800 (1957). Regarding CERCLA, Congress intended the "courts to develop a federal common law to supplement
the statute." Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988). See also
Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. L-Bar Prods., Inc., 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990).
342. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., Inc., 412 U.S. 580 (1973); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States. 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See also E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 340, § 6.2, at 301-05; Field, supra note 24, at
953-54, and cases cited in each.
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come.3 43 In many CERCLA cases the United States is a party to the suit.34 ' In
addition, the federal government often has an interest in CERCLA cases
brought by others. In some cases a person who is not a "responsible person,"
may have cleaned up a site or taken other "remedial action." If that person
cannot recover from a "responsible person" Superfund will reimburse the person
who performed the cleanup. 345 Since the government has an interest in keeping
the levels of the Superfund high, it has an interest in the private action under
CERCLA between the person who performed the cleanup or remedial action
and the "responsible party."
The key question becomes whether to borrow state law to determine who is
an operator or to develop a uniform federal rule as to shareholder liability as an
"operator." First, the problem is not simply one of borrowing or adopting state
law to determine who is an operator. State law has not developed a definition of
"operator" that can be borrowed here. The problem is, therefore, unlike several
Supreme Court cases which borrowed state law.34 6 Rather, the question is
whether the federal courts should adopt the state corporate concept of limited
liability when they define "operator." A shareholder would argue that direct
shareholder liability cannot exist under CERCLA if CERCLA definitions are
read to include incidents of state law. Specifically, if state law is incorporated
into the determination of whether shareholders are "operators" when their cor-
porations are operators, then they are protected by the state rule of limited
liability.347 The government would argue that these incidents of state law should
not be included in the definition of "operator."
The Supreme Court has set forth several factors for courts to consider in
deciding whether to adopt state law or create a federal rule of decision when
developing federal common law. The most frequently cited factor is the demand
for uniformity under a particular federal program.34 8 Courts should also con-
sider whether applying state law would "frustrate specific objectives of the fed-
343. Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 470 U.S. 500 (1988).
344. The United States was a named party in eleven of the twenty-odd cases discussed in this Article.
345. For example, a local government or a private party may perform a cleanup in some cases. See §§ 9604,
9607(a)(4)(B), 9611 (a)(2).
346. For example, the CERCLA problem is very different from the problem presented in De Sylva v. Ballen-
tine, 351 U.S. 570 (1955), which involved the interpretation of the word "children" in the federal copyright law.
The states have developed a body of family law, which the federal courts have not, and the Court therefore
decided to adopt state law in defining the term especially since determining the legal relationships of other persons
who might be entitled to inherit would require reference to state law. Id. Interestingly, the Court noted that "this
does not mean that a state would be entitled to use the word 'children' in any way entirely strange. ... * Id. at
581.
347. In this case, a shareholder could only be liable if one of the state exceptions to limited liability were
found: the corporate veil were pierced or the corporate actor rule applied.
348. In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc, 440 U.S. 715 (1979), the Supreme Court said: "Undoubtedly.
federal programs that 'by their nature are and must be uniform in character throughout the Nation' necessitate
formulation of controlling federal rules. Conversely, when there is little need for a nationally uniform body of law,
state law may be incorporated as the federal rule of decision." Id. at 728.
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eral program" a 9 and whether and to what extent a federal rule would "disrupt
commercial relationships predicated on state law." 350
First, CERCLA is a national response to a national problem. 35' As such,
CERCLA demands uniformity of application. Several courts have held that
CERCLA requires the development of a uniform federal rule of decision in
other contexts-such as the standards needed to pierce a corporate veil,3 52 and
the standards of successor liability. 353 It is significant that the United States
Supreme Court has recognized that environmental problems "are not suscepti-
ble of a local solution." 3" Thus, the courts must develop a uniform definition of
the term "operator." Second, applying state law could frustrate the purpose of
placing liability on those "responsible." A person otherwise responsible in the
ordinary sense would escape liability merely by virtue of stock ownership if the
state law were fully incorporated into the federal definition. The shareholder's
best argument is based on the third part of the Kimbell test: that a rule impos-
ing liability on the shareholder will interfere with his relationship with the cor-
poration established by state law. This argument has some merit to it on a su-
perficial level only. In the CERCLA context, Congress has already disrupted
commercial relationships by imposing a new form of liability on a number of
persons. Thus, the third point is not logically applicable in CERCLA cases.
Further, any such disruption is outweighed by the other two factors just dis-
cussed: the need for uniformity and the fact that applying state law might inter-
fere with a Congressional purpose.
The shareholders might also argue that uniformity could be achieved by
adopting state law since virtually every state grants limited liability to share-
holders of a corporation. However, state corporate laws vary with respect to
when and to what extent shareholders can be held liable. For example, New
York places liability on certain shareholders for unpaid wage claims.355 The
state corporate laws vary with respect to shareholder liability for acts taken by
349. Id. The Court said:
Apart from considerations of uniformity, we must also determine whether application of state law would
frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs. If so, we must fashion special rules solicitous of those
federal interests. Finally, our choice-of-law inquiry must consider the extent to which application of a
federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law.
350. Id. at 729.
351. In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. 22, 31 (D. Mass. 1987); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F.
Supp. 15, (D.R.I. 1989), affd, 910 F.2d 24 (Ist Cir. 1990), cert. denied, I I I S. Ct. 957 (1991) (quoting Acushnet
River). The program in United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., Inc., 412 U.S. 580 (1973), was similarly
described as being "national in scope," id. at 597, and the court in Lake Misere declined to "borrow" state law.
352. Mobay Corp. v. Allied Signal, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1248 (D.N.J. 1991); United States v. Kayser-Roth,
724 F. Supp. 15, 19-20 (D.R.I. 1989); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1201-02 (E.D. Pa.
1989): In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. 22, 30-31 (D. Mass. 1987). See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
353. Smith Land and Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1986).
354. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) and cases cited therein.
355. For example, N. Y. Bus. CORP. LAws § 630(a) (McKinney 1986) provides:
The ten largest shareholders, . . . of every corporation .. .no shares of which are listed on a national
securities exchange or regularly quoted in an over-the-counter market . .. shall jointly and severally be
personally liable for all debts, wages or salaries due and owing to any of its laborers, servants or employees
other than contractors, for services performed by them for such corporation.
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a director with the shareholder's knowledge. 356 Further, some states have en-
acted or are considering special laws for close corporations, some of which in-
clude a provision that the failure to observe corporate formalities is not a
ground for disregarding the rule of limited liability.351 Thus, state-level uni-
formity is superficial and illusory.
Furthermore, the concern for federal uniformity is not only for current uni-
formity but also for uniformity in the future. Even if a federal court adopts
state law as the federal rule of decision, states may change their current rules
and thus leave the next federal court to decide the question in the next jurisdic-
tion with a new aberrant state law.358 Finally, if the state law is incorporated
with respect to shareholder liability as an operator, state law would be incorpo-
rated with respect to others who might be considered operators. Any state stat-
ute protecting one from certain forms of liability would arguably have to be
adopted by the federal courts in defining "operator"--a result that would be
anything but uniform. To assure national uniformity, the courts must develop
uniform federal rules of decision with respect to CERCLA liability.
The need for uniformity and the interest the United States has in CER-
CLA actions require the courts to develop a federal rule of decision rather than
adopting state law in developing the federal common law that will accompany
CERCLA.
b. Preemption: The "Conflict" with State Law
Like the relationship between statutory interpretation and federal common
law, preemption and federal common law are related principles and it is not
clear where one ends and another begins. Principles of both can be used to
"displace" state law.359
Courts which conclude that CERCLA can be read to impose liability on a
shareholder in his, her or its own right need not be concerned with the state rule
of limited liability. First, if one accepts the view that any person who is found to
356. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 278, 282 (1983) (Shareholders liable for the lesser of the extent of
the distribution to them or their pro rata share of the claim three years following dissolution) with REVISED
MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §§ 6.33, 6.44, 14.07 (1985) (any action against a dissolved corporation must be brought
within five years, shareholders liable to directors if director must reimburse corporation for improper distribution
and shareholder knew the distribution was in violation of the corporate laws or articles of incorporation).
357. For example, the MODEL STAT. CLOSE CORPORATION Supp. to the REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §
25 (1985) provides:
The failure of a statutory close corporation to observe the usual formalities or requirements relating to the
exercise of its corporate powers or management of its business and affairs is not a ground for imposing
personal liability on the shareholders for liabilities of the for corporation.
Pennsylvania recently adopted a new corporation law and included a form of statutory close corporation patterned
after this model. PA. Bus. CORP. LAW of 1988, 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2301 et. seq. (Purdon Supp. 1990).
See Garrity, The New Pennsylvania Corporation Law, 45 Bus. LAW. 57, 61 (1989). See also CAL CORP. CODE §
300(e) (West 1990).
358. The possibility of abuse has been recognized in several cases, see, e.g., United States v. Little Lake
Misere Land Co., Inc. 412 U.S. 580 (1973).
359. See Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). In Boyle, the Court referred to some of the
principles applied in deciding whether to create a uniform federal rule of decision in federal common law cases.
Id. at 507-08 (referring to Kimbell Foods, supra notes 348-50. regarding the frustration of federal objectives by
applying state law).
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be an "operator" is liable directly under CERCLA, then there is no conflict
between CERCLA and the state law of limited liability. Liability is not im-
posed because of the relationship of the shareholder to the responsible corpora-
tion; liability is direct.
Alternatively, one could say that there is a direct conflict here-the share-
holder is liable under CERCLA while such liability would be barred under state
law. In the case of a direct conflict, federal law controls. 360
Finally, there is a third possibility: it is not clear whether a conflict exists
or not. CERCLA does not expressly place liability on shareholders of operator
corporations, and the shareholders will argue that, absent a clear indication
from Congress, they are protected by the rule of limited liability. The Fifth
Circuit, in Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., accepted this argument, al-
though it did not discuss preemption.361 As discussed earlier, the reliance in
Joslyn that limited liability prevails unless Congress indicates otherwise is mis-
placed362 since that court assumed limited liability was a common law principle.
The court was incorrect in applying the concept of limited liability so broadly to
a federal statute.
Two additional arguments indicate that federal law, i.e., CERCLA, con-
trols over the rule of limited liability if the conflict is deemed unclear or indi-
rect. First, CERCLA specifically provides that the liability placed upon owners,
operators, arrangers and transporters is imposed "notwithstanding any other
rule of law."' 383 This suggests that Congress recognized that there may be con-
flicts with other rules of law and that it intended CERCLA to prevail. In fact,
Congress seems to be paraphrasing the supremacy clause itself here.
Second, a state statute can be "preempted" or, as the Supreme Court re-
cently held, "displaced," when the state law "'would frustrate specific objec-
tives' of federal legislation."364 The United States Supreme Court has held a
state law granting immunity to parole board members for their acts does not
apply in a case brought under a federal law (in that case, a civil rights ac-
360. US. CoNsr. art. VI cl. 2.
361. 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, I I S. Ct. 1017 (1991), see supra text accompanying notes
158-84. The court said that it is the rule that when a legislature wants to "change the interpretation of a judi-
cially created concept, it makes that intent specific." 893 F.2d at 83 (emphasis added). And later it said,
"[w]ithout an express Congressional directive to the contrary, common law principles such as limited liability,
govern our court's analysis." Id.
362. As discussed earlier, limited liability is a creature of statute (usually state statute). The principle of
limited liability did not develop as part of the common law, and Congress has not altered the common law.
Instead, it has created in CERCLA a law that imposes liability on persons who may happen to be shareholders of
a corporation that may or may not itself be liable as an owner or operator.
363. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1989) provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision or
rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section- . [four categories of
liable parties] shall be liable for .. all . ..costs of removal or remedial action."
364. Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (citing Kimbell Foods). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 481 (2d ed. 1988); Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bar-
gaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1983) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)). This shows the contin-
uing confusion between certain types of "preemption" and "federal common law" as Boyle is generally considered
to be a federal common law ease.
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tion) . 5 At least two district courts have held that CERCLA preempts state
tort immunity statutes.3 66 These cases are similar to the question of shareholder
liability since in both cases the defendant is claiming that state law protects one
from liability.36 7 In each case, CERCLA preempts state law since state law
would absolve one from liability intended by Congress.3 6 8
This does not mean that limited liability should be abolished in all CER-
CLA cases. That would mean that whenever a corporation was found responsi-
ble its shareholders would be liable as well. Rather, once a court determines
that a person is an operator, that person, shareholder or not, is liable in her own
right. To the extent the principle of limited liability conflicts with that liability,
the state statutes granting limited liability are preempted.
3. A Test for Shareholder Liability
a. Operators
First, the development of a test for determining when a person is an opera-
tor is a matter of statutory interpretation or the creation of federal common
law. The federal courts have the power to create the tests without regard to
365. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 (1980) (A statute granting immunity to members of a
parole board for their actions in releasing a person on parole, would not protect the parole board members in a
suit based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
366. Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle, 605 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Del. 1985). See also United
States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 686 F. Supp. 696 (S.D. Ind. 1988). In Artesian, a state statute provided
immunity to all local governments unless another statute provided otherwise. The county had owned and operated
a landfill. The plaintiff spent $10 million in cleanup and other response costs and sued the county to recover these
costs. The county asserted its immunity under state statute. The court said that CERCLA places liability on the
county while the state statute removes it and held, "If this is not an actual conflict situation, it clearly is one in
which Delaware's Tort Claims Act stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives
which Congress sought to fulfill in enacting CERCLA. Therefore, the Tort Claims Act is preempted." 605 F.
Supp. at 1354.
In 1986, Congress made it clear that state and local governments could be liable under CERCLA. First,
Congress exempted these governmental units from being "owners or operators" if they had acquired their owner-
ship involuntarily (such as through a tax foreclosure). The section went on to make it clear, however, that such an
involuntary acquisition would not absolve a state or local government from liability if it were responsible for the
contamination. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1989) (plurality opinion). See also 491 U.S. at 5-
23 regarding the ability of Congress to use the commerce clause to override the eleventh amendment.
Normally states are immune from monetary liability claims of individuals under the eleventh amendment.
However, Congress can override this immunity by a clear indication and the proper exercise of one of its powers
(here the power based on the commerce clause).
367. A similar argument was made with respect to the liability of dissolved corporations under CERCLA.
Note, Corporate Life After Death: CERCLA Preemption of State Corporate Dissolution Law, 88 MICH. L. REV.
131 (1989).
368. At first blush, it might seem that a distinction can be made between the immunity statutes and the
statutes providing limited liability for shareholders. The immunity statutes provide an exception to liability for
certain acts of governments or their agents. The exception to liability is direct. The corporate statutes create a
system through which a corporation can be formed and can act, and limited liability for corporate acts is given to
shareholders. When examined further, however, these two sets of statutes are quite similar. Governments must act
through agents: officials, employees, parole board members. Corporations too must act through agents: officers,
directors and ultimately the shareholders who control the election of the directors and employment of officers. In
both cases a federal statute would impose liability while a state statute would relieve one of that liability. If the
state immunity statutes have been found to be inconsistent with CERCLA and therefore preempted, so should the
limited liability provisions of corporate laws when they conflict with a finding that the shareholder is an operator
and thus liable.
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state law and, in fact, courts should disregard state law in the interests of
uniformity. 69
In considering the liability of shareholders, two parameters are important.
One is the degree of involvement the shareholder has with the toxic waste dispo-
sal and the other is the character of the shareholder (individual or corporate).
Several examples of shareholder involvement will help define the contours of a
test to be applied with respect to shareholder liability as an operator.
1.Corporation X manufactures pesticides. It owns its own plant and surrounding land.
After manufacturing the pesticides, Corporation X regularly spills toxic by-products
onto its land. Ms. Smith is the sole shareholder of X Corporation. She controls and
actually manages all aspects of the corporation and of the production and activities at
the plant.
2.Same as above except that Ms. Smith has hired someone else to run the plant. She
has very little contact with the management and operations at the site itself, although
she continues to manage and have complete control over the corporation.
3.Corporation X manufactures pesticides, it has always disposed of the toxic by-prod-
ucts properly and has respected all laws and regulations concerning the environmental
aspects of its business. Ms. Smith decides to retire. She wants to continue to own
Corporation X, but wants no involvement with it whatsoever. She appoints her son as
the sole director and president. Her son has worked in the business for some time and
has always acted responsibly with respect to all aspects of the business, including envi-
ronmental matters.
The individual shareholder could be replaced in each of these three exam-
ples with a corporate shareholder, producing a parent/subsidiary effect. For
example:
Assume the same facts as in number 1 above except that Corporation X is owned by
Parent Corporation. Parent Corporation approves all hiring and firing, it reviews the
finances and must authorize all expenditures over $1000. It approves the environmen-
tal policy at the facility and Parent's officers, directors and shareholders know about
the disposal of the toxic by-products at the site.
The only difficulty as we move from individual shareholders to corporate
shareholders is that it is harder to determine for whom the corporate agents are
acting. That is, the corporate shareholder must act through agents. These
agents are often directors or officers of the parent corporation as well as the
subsidiary. When they act it is difficult to determine whether they are acting for
the parent or the subsidiary.31 0
From the principles of statutory interpretation in the CERCLA context,
discussed earlier, 37 1 we can identify factors that indicate whether one is an oper-
ator. Each of these factors represent one or more of the following considera-
tions: a "plain meaning" approach, an approach placing liability on those "re-
sponsible," an approach providing an appropriate "deterrent effect," as well as a
"broad interpretation" approach. The factors that indicate a shareholder may
be an "operator" under CERCLA include:
369. See supra text accompanying notes 349-57.
370. See, e.g., Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222, 230-31 (W.D. La. 1989), affd, 893
F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, I II S. Ct. 957 (1991) (respecting the corporate "fiction" that the officers
wore the proper hats at the appropriate times when the court considered the question of veil piercing).
371. See supra text accompanying notes 316-38.
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1. actual participation in the management of the site
2. ability to control the management of the site
3. actual participation in the management of the corporation
4. ability to control the management of the corporation a 2
CERCLA imposes liability on the "operator" of a facility. In the first ex-
ample, set out above, the shareholder is actually managing the facility. This is
sufficient to consider her an "operator." To do so furthers all of the goals of the
statute, including placing the costs on those "responsible" and of internalization
of costs. It is also faithful to the remedial nature of the statute. Thus, the first
factor is sufficient to create liability as an operator. As the courts have done in
the past, they will have to look at the specific facts to determine whether a
shareholder was "managing" or "operating" the facility.
In the second example, the shareholder has only the power to control the
facility through control of the corporation. Someone else is now managing the
facility itself. Nevertheless, the shareholder cannot escape liability by hiring
someone else and turning a blind eye. In fact, several courts have recognized the
danger of allowing a shareholder in a position of power to claim that he or she
did not know about the activity and therefore should not be liable.373 Further,
although the statute imposes liability on one who operates a "facility" the fac-
tors concerning participation in and power over the corporation are relevant to
show participation in and ability to control the facility. This scenario is covered
by the second and third factors, either one of which is sufficient to consider the
shareholder an "operator." The shareholder has the ability to control the facil-
ity; the shareholder is actually managing the corporation and through that man-
agement has the ability to manage the facility. Likewise any parent in either
position should also be considered an operator, but, as mentioned earlier, proof
may be more difficult in the case of a parent/subsidiary relationship.
For the most part, the courts have developed tests appropriate to the lan-
guage and intent of CERCLA and have held shareholders liable in situations
similar to the first two examples. 3 4
A variation of the first two examples is the shareholder who does not own a
majority of the shares but who actually wields power or is active at the facility
or in the corporation. So far, courts that have considered the liability of a mi-
nority but active shareholder have held that such a person may be liable. 375
372. Additional factors may indicate the presence of one or more of the above factors. For example, actual
participation in the waste disposal or awareness of the disposal could indicate some degree of participation in or
control over the facility. The fact that one was receiving a benefit from the disposal might also tend to show
control.
373. On several occasions courts have explicitly refused to relieve one of liability on a claim of ignorance.
See. e.g., United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884 (D.N.C. 1985), discussed supra text accompanying notes 299-
303.
374. The exception is, of course, Joslyn. See supra Part Ill for a discussion of the cases concerning share-
holder liability under CERCLA.
375. See. e.g., Riverside Mkt. Dev. Corp. v. International Bldg. Prod., No. 88-5317, Slip. Op., (E.D. La.
May 23, 1990) 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6375; United States v. McGraw Edison Co., 718 F. Supp. 152 (W.D.N.Y.
1989); Kelley v. Arco Indus. Corp. 723 F. Supp. 1214 (W.D. Mich. 1989). See supra text accompanying notes
259-62, 252-57, and 266-78, respectively.
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Since each of these cases was decided on pre-trial motions there has as yet been
no ruling on the merits in these cases.
Only one court has considered the liability of the passive shareholder-the
third example. That court granted summary judgment for a shareholder who
owned 85 percent of the stock, was chairman of the board, and a principal
source of money but who was only minimally involved in the operations at the
facility.37 6 Other courts have said in passing that in order to hold a shareholder
liable more is required than mere control or power and have implied that the
power must be exercised. However, these cases involved situations in which the
shareholders had in fact exercised the power and thus this language is dic-
tum.377 On the other hand, the court in the Arco Industries and Thomas Sol-
vent cases expressly indicated that the power to control the corporation was to
be taken into account in determining whether a particular individual could have
prevented the harm.378 As written the test might place liability on a sole but
passive shareholder who technically has the power to control all aspects of the
corporation. Since these three Kelley cases involved preliminary motions, they
have yet to be tried and it is yet to be seen where the court will go with the
test.37
9
The passive, controlling shareholder is the most difficult of the three cases
presented and at some point the courts may have to decide the question. In
example three, the shareholder has always acted responsibly. What will happen
if her son begins disposing of the toxic waste on the property? Ms. Smith does
have the power to control the corporation and ultimately the facility but she is
not exercising that power. If she is not held liable, would the answer change if
she had handed over the management of the company to a notorious toxic waste
dumper known to everyone in the pesticide industry including Ms. Smith? Once
beyond the first three factors, answers are unclear and require additional con-
siderations. Specifically, when we are considering the liability of a majority
shareholder who has the power to control the corporation and the facility but
has chosen to be passive, the responsibility with which that shareholder exer-
cises that power must be considered. The passive, majority shareholder is in a
position to avoid the harm. As such, she has a duty to exercise that power in a
responsible manner. This mesh of control with more traditional notions of duties
to others provides a guide in assessing liability against the passive shareholder.
376. Riverside Mkt. Dev. Corp. v. International Bldg. Prod., No. 88-5317, Slip. Op. (E.D. La. May 23,
1990) 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6375.
377. See, e.g., City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 112 Bankr. 540, 548 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Idaho v. Bunker
Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986).
378. Arco Industries, 723 F. Supp. at 1219; Thomas Solvent 1, 727 F. Supp. at 1543; Thomas Solvent 11,
727 F. Supp. at 1561-62. See supra text accompanying notes 263-81 for a discussion of these cases.
In determining whether a person "could have prevented" the harm, the court is to look at the power of the
person to control the waste disposal practices, including the power of the person in or over the corporation gener-
ally. and to the actual responsibility for waste disposal. These two factors seem to be independent. See supra text
accompanying note 278.
379. As noted earlier, the Arco Industries case has been settled. See supra note 264.
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b. Arrangers and Transporters
As discussed earlier, when a corporation is technically an "arranger" or a
"transporter" a shareholder can be deemed an arranger or transporter as well if
it directly participates in the arranging or transporting. Beyond that, can a
shareholder be liable as an arranger or a transporter if it is involved in the
management of the corporation or has control over the corporation? Here the
interpretation of the statute is more difficult. "Management" or "control" does
not connote "arranging" or "transporting" the same way it connotes "operator."
Yet Congressional intent to place the cost on the "responsible party" and those
who have gained from the harm would seem to support liability. However, the
current structure of the liability provisions makes it difficult for a court to im-
pose liability as an arranger or transporter when the shareholder was not actu-
ally involved in the arrangements or transportation. Thus, in these categories
there is a particular need for Congressional intervention and clarification.
B. Legislative Action
CERCLA, as amended in 1986, will expire in 1991 and Congress will have
to take affirmative steps to reauthorize the program.3 80 As part of this reconsid-
eration, Congress should settle the unresolved questions concerning shareholder
liability. This will enable courts to apply the statute more easily and it will
eliminate the need to resolve the split among the circuits.
Congress should clarify the independent liability of those who happen to
act within the corporate form, such as shareholders, officers, directors, and em-
ployees, and who are involved with the disposal of hazardous substances by
amending the appropriate provisions of sections 9607(a)(l)-(4) or the corre-
sponding definitional provisions in section 9601. For example, Congress can
amend the definition of "operator" to include a shareholder (or anyone) who
participates in the management of the facility or the responsible corporation.
"Arranger" and "transporter" can be amended to include those who control the
institutional arranger or transporter. This will take a significant burden from
the courts.
V. CONCLUSION
Several questions remain unresolved concerning the liability of sharehold-
ers when they are involved in the operations or in control of a facility where
hazardous substances have been deposited. Similar questions arise when the
shareholders are in control or involved with the corporation responsible for the
disposal. Courts will continue to consider these questions and attempt to resolve
the questions of shareholder liability. However, given the recent conflict among
the circuit courts of appeals, some courts may simply refuse to impose liability
on shareholders. This conflict must be resolved eventually by the Supreme
380. Congress reauthorized CERCLA in 1986. See supra note I. It authorized appropriations for CERCLA
for a five year period beginning in October 1986. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9611 (a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
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Court or Congress. Congress should clarify the liability provisions of CERCLA
to remove this burden from an already overburdened judiciary. To the extent
the courts must continue to decide the question of shareholder liability, they can
be guided by the degree of control alone or in combination with more tradi-
tional notions of duties owed to others.

